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of Transformative Internet Memes
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The influence of social media in the 21st century has led to new
social norms of behavior with individuals presenting themselves to
others, whether physically or virtually, on various social media platforms. As a result, these new trends have led recent society to be
characterized as a “presentational cultural regime” and a “specular economy.” In a Bakhtinian digital carnivalesque, internet
memes present a feast of challenges to exceptions and limitations in
copyright law. Memes encompass a wide range of expression about
the human experience, while also existing as a playful mode of culturally permissible expression in online social communications rather than as self-contained and specific categories such as parody
or satire. This Article analyzes how, and to what extent, internet
memes should be protected by the fair use doctrine. It concludes that
as the digital intercommunicative persona construction becomes
pandemic in the contemporary moment, more and more images will
inevitably become the raw materials in the online making and remaking of the public self in an anti-hierarchical networked community. Copyright law is slowly and belatedly learning a new cultural
vocabulary that it needs to translate into a legal lexicon relevant to
judges and lawmakers.
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INTRODUCTION
Internet memes provide a cogent example of how cultural expression shapes and is shaped by digital technology, which demonstrates the constant challenge of reconciling social norms of online
communication with the fair use doctrine in copyright law. Recent
society has been described with terms such as “presentational cultural regime” and “specular economy.”1 These characterizations reflect how the influence of social media in the 21st Century has led to
new social norms of behavior where individuals present themselves
to others, whether physically or virtually, on various social media
platforms and impels innovative economic models. The digital
1

P. DAVID MARSHALL, THE CELEBRITY PERSONA PANDEMIC 5, 37 (2016) [hereinafter
“THE CELEBRITY PERSONA PANDEMIC”]; P. David Marshall, The Specular Economy:
Celebrity, Two-Way Mirrors, and the Personalization of Renown, 47(6) SOC’Y 498 (2010)
[hereinafter “The Specular Economy”].
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culture has led to a pronounced focus on the production of the self
or an online persona—whether through Facebook, Instagram,
LinkedIn, Twitter, or Pinterest, billions of individuals worldwide are
constantly making and remaking public versions of themselves for
myriad purposes and monitoring these profiles daily. David Marshall observes that:
[T]he new technologies of the social—such as Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter—position the individual differently in the chain of communication, in the
organization of engagement, and in the play of connection . . . we are on a spectrum of presentation of
the self . . . producing our personas for publics.2
Social media inherently encourages the production of the online
public persona that resembles the serialization of fictional characters
in a television or movie series.3 Individuals are using a combination
of images, videos, text, handles and hashtags on social media to construct their online identities. Indeed “[t]hrough the circulation of viral images, texts, and videos . . . [and] memes, we replicate and seriate content that at some level seriates personas in terms of humor,
connection, and value.”4
As the COVID-19 pandemic ravaged the world and governments enforced draconian lockdown measures, individuals have
stormed social media to express their frustration, anger, and despair.5 The proliferation of memes and parody videos on YouTube
provide humorous outlets to convey our emotions and criticisms of
political leaders and government agencies in their handling of the
pandemic.6 Images and videos are widely shared and reposted, often
2

THE CELEBRITY PERSONA PANDEMIC, supra note 1, at 39.
For a discussion, see id. at 48–63.
4
Id. at 63.
5
E.g., Casey Schwartz, Is Everybody Doing…OK? Let’s Ask Social Media, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/12/style/self-care/social-media-.html
[https://perma.cc/S365-DPTN]; Koustuv Saha, John Torous, Eric D. Caine, & Munmun
De Choundhury, Psychosocial Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic: Large-Scale QuasiExperimental Study on Social Media, 22(11) J. MED. INTERNET RES. (2020),
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/33156805/ [https://perma.cc/8267-VV2H].
6
See, e.g., Olivia Blair, 230 Coronavirus Memes To Get You Through Self-Isolation
and Social Distancing, ELLE (Feb. 24, 2021), https://www.elle.com/uk/life-and3
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at breakneck speed. Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept of “carnival laughter” provides an apropos lens through which we can view these behavior on social media “as a spectacular feast of inversion and parody of high culture.”7 The cult theory of carnival culture first espoused by Bakhtin in his book Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics is
a familiar one to many scholars of literature, culture and political
science.8 There is a tendency on social media for a different set of
rules to operate, one “in which anti-hierarchism, relativity of values,
questioning of authority, openness, joyous anarchy, and the ridiculing of all dogmas hold sway.”9 Other scholars have already invoked
Bakhtin’s analytical paradigm of the carnivalesque to explain the
presidential campaign of Donald Trump,10 and have suggested that
fair use can represent carnivalesque resistance to the hierarchies inherent in copyright law.11 This Article, however, goes further to postulate that the notion of the carnivalesque as applied to social media
platforms does not require the creative practices to be modes of expression that present a resistance to authority, but merely one that
embodies performance as “a spectacle seen by the people [where]
they live in it, and [where] everyone participates because its very
idea embraces all the people.”12
Images posted or circulated on social media have arguably
the same purpose as the “social photograph” in the manner
culture/g31803505/coronavirus-social-distancing-memes/ [https://perma.cc/A693-QP72];
Abram Brown, Laugh Away the Apocalypse with These 15 Coronavirus Memes, FORBES
(Mar. 21, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/abrambrown/2020/03/21/laugh-away-theapocalypse-with-these-15-coronavirus-memes/?sh=505a831723fc
[https://perma.cc/SXE8-CF6E]; CDC Coronavirus Guidelines (Parody), YOUTUBE (Mar.
24, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x503AEbk-TU [https://perma.cc/J649ARHT].
7
Renate Lachmann, Bakhtin and Carnival: Culture as Counter-Culture, 11 CULTURAL
CRITIQUE 115, 118 (Raoul Eshelman & Marc Davis, trans., 1988-89).
8
MIKHAIL BAKHTIN, PROBLEMS OF DOSTOEVSKY’S POETICS (Caryl Emerson, ed. &
trans., 1984).
9
Lachmann, supra note 7, at 118.
10
See, e.g., Elizaveta Gaufman, The Trump Carnival: Popular Appeal in the Age of
Misinformation, 32(4) INT’L RELS. 410 (2018); Shaheed Nick Mohammed & Robert C.
Trumpbour, The Carnivalesque in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Campaign, PRESIDENTIAL
STUD. Q. (2020) (forthcoming), available at (https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12658)
[https://perma.cc/FK2C-WAP8].
11
Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Fair Use as Resistance, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 377 (2019).
12
MIKHAIL BAKHTIN, RABELAIS AND HIS WORLD 6, 7 (Helen Iswolsky, trans., 1984).
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contemplated by Nathan Jurgenson; the image object itself is less its
own end but a means of communicating an experience.13 The posting of selfies, social photographs, and memes all form “part of an
ongoing communication of who you are, what you are experiencing,
the simple fact that you exist and are live doing things.”14 One of the
authors of this Article previously argued that a well-known literary
or artistic work does much more than simply educate, inform or entertain; it also functions as a signifier of a set of signified meanings
which are relevant to triggering the protection of the First Amendment when used in particular expressive ways.15 Here, as part of a
stream of continual postings—or in Marshall’s parlance, a serialization of an online public persona—photographs and memes form a
nuanced visual literacy that plays with the distinction between the
world of real objects and their symbolic meaning as a “means to
express feelings, ideas, and experiences in the moment, a means
sometimes more important than the specific ends of a particular image.”16 These images transcend their original purpose in social media postings as they are utilized as raw materials and repurposed for
their semiotic values in the serialized construction of the online
public persona.
As the digital intercommunicative persona construction becomes “pandemic in the contemporary moment”,17 more and more
images, videos, and text will inevitably become the raw materials in
the online making and remaking of the public self. Copyright law is
slowly and belatedly learning a new cultural vocabulary that it needs
to translate into a legal lexicon relevant to judges and lawmakers.
But it is never too late to learn a new language.
This Article analyzes how internet memes are protected by the
fair use doctrine, and to what extent they should be, under U.S.
copyright law. Internet memes present a nebulous challenge to

13

NATHAN JURGENSON, THE SOCIAL PHOTO: ON PHOTOGRAPHY AND SOCIAL MEDIA 16–
17 (2019).
14
Id. at 16.
15
David Tan, The Lost Language of the First Amendment in Copyright Fair Use: A
Semiotic Perspective of the “Transformative Use” Doctrine Twenty-Five Years On, 26
FORDHAM INT. PROP, MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 311, 316 (2016).
16
JURGENSON, supra note 13, at 18.
17
THE CELEBRITY PERSONA PANDEMIC, supra note 1, at 1. See also id. at 71–77.
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exceptions and limitations in copyright law, as they encompass a
wide range of expression about the human experience—they exist
as a mode of culturally permissible expression in online social communications rather than as self-contained and specific categories
such as parody or satire. Memes are a pervasive form of expression
online and may incorporate image or video elements. They are
shared across a variety of internet platforms such as blogs, Facebook, and Instagram as commentary or to further discourse. They
rely on the viewer’s prior knowledge of a creative work or digital
subculture to make the necessary semiotic connections, often drawing from copyrighted works of popular culture such as films, television series, paintings, or photographs. Ultimately, internet memes
may be conceived as remixed, iterated discursive units of digital culture typified by rapid diffusion that inhere some form of commentary, admittedly to widely varying degrees.18
Part I considers the fair use doctrine in the U.S. and interrogates
specifically how it is able to accommodate the notion of the carnivalesque within the rubric of the First Amendment in its protection
of expressive and symbolic speech. Part II explores the role of
memes as a mode of expression in what may broadly be referred to
as “digital culture” to demonstrate a lack of alignment between
online cultural norms of use and the prevailing traditional understanding of copyright law. Part III applies fair use doctrine to different categories of internet memes to determine the extent to which
this genre of digital expression qualifies as fair use. The Article concludes on a cautionary note, urging the US judiciary to embrace a
culturally sensitive interpretation of the first factor of fair use especially when considering novel and overwhelmingly non-commercial
secondary uses that do not visually transform the underlying work.

18

BRADLEY E. WIGGINS, THE DISCURSIVE POWER OF MEMES
IDEOLOGY, SEMIOTICS, AND INTERTEXTUALITY 11 (2019).

IN

DIGITAL CULTURE:
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I. FAIR USE
A. Contextualizing Fair Use within a Carnivalesque Cultural
Milieu
Copyright law is intended to promote creativity and innovation
by providing fair compensation to copyright holders. However, the
exclusive rights of the copyright holder give way to a user’s right
allowing limited, unauthorized use of protected works to prevent
these rights from stifling creativity and innovation. Open-ended fair
use in the U.S. and categorical fair dealing provisions in other countries like the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia both operate to
temper the exclusive rights of copyright owners with the public interest to foster further creative expression by permitting secondary
uses of copyrighted works,19 which provides the primary mechanism to balance copyright protection with the broader public interest
of fostering creative expression.20 In the U.S., the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals has led the charge in regarding the “public interest” as a guiding consideration in conducting the overall fair use
analysis: “transformative uses tend to favor a fair use finding
because a transformative use is one that communicates something
new and different from the original or expands its utility, thus
serving copyright’s overall objective of contributing to public
knowledge.”21 In a comprehensive analysis of policy clusters, Pamela Samuelson has similarly concluded that the primary purpose of
copyright is “to promote the public good, or as the U.S. Constitution
puts it, ‘promote the [p]rogress of Science and useful Arts.’”22
The Copyright Act, enacted by Congress under the authority of
the U.S. Constitution’s Copyright Clause, grants individuals monopoly-like power to preclude others from using copyrighted material in their expression.23 It is this “paradox” that creates the

19

Emily Hudson, Implementing Fair Use in Copyright Law: Lessons from Australia, 25
INTELL. PROP. J. 201 (2013).
20
See e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
21
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 214 (2d Cir. 2015). See also Haochen
Sun, Copyright Law as an Engine of Public Interest Protection, 16 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 123, 137–139 (2019).
22
Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Use, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2617 (2009).
23
17 U.S.C. § 106.
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tension—copyright laws grant a copyright owner the right to suppress or abridge another person’s freedom of speech when that person seeks to express copyrighted material.24 However, on a number
of occasions, the Supreme Court has rejected any further independent consideration of the impact of the First Amendment on copyright
law, pronouncing that “copyright law contains built-in First Amendment accommodations.”25 As a “traditional contour” of copyright
law, the Court held that the “fair use defense affords considerable
latitude for scholarship and comment . . . even for parody.”26 Justice
Ginsburg delivering the opinion of the Court in Golan v. Holder emphasized the “speech-protective purposes and safeguards embraced
by copyright law”27 and assured that the public may freely use the
author’s expression “in certain circumstances.”28 Indeed the Supreme Court’s ruling in Golan makes it clear that the fair use defense
has “constitutional import” and “reaffirms that copyright law poses
a First Amendment paradox that cannot be ignored.”29
One may regard Golan v. Holder as recognizing copyright law
as implicitly establishing a hierarchy that values certain kinds of
works and authors/users/speakers over others by assigning different
levels of protection and value to each of them. In the shadows of the
First Amendment, original speakers (authors), derivative speakers
(fair users and infringers) and the audience (general public and consumers) are engaged in a communicative discourse.30 In his analysis
of the potential of audience reconstruction with dominant symbols
of a culture, John Fiske coined the term “semiotic democracy” to
describe a world where empowered audiences freely and widely engage in the use of cultural symbols to express meanings that are

24

See, e.g., NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 3 (2010) (“Yet
copyright also burdens speech. We often copy or build upon another’s words, images, or
music to convey our own ideas effectively. We cannot do that if a copyright holder
withholds permission or insists upon a license fee that is beyond our means.”).
25
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003). See also Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302,
328 (2012); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Ents., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).
26
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219–220.
27
Golan, 565 U.S. at 328 (internal citations omitted).
28
Id. (citing Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219).
29
Neil Weinstock Netanel, First Amendment Constraints on Copyright After Golan v.
Holder, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1082, 1128 (2013).
30
Rosenblatt, supra note 11, at 381.
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different from the ones intended by their creators.31 As forms of relational discourse, semiotics and the theory of intertextuality are intimately intertwined. Bakhtin viewed the products of authorship as
reliant on, and inevitably inflected with, both the author’s voice and
the voices of others—ultimately a dialogic practice.32 Bakhtin has
emphasized that the “utterance” is always the site of ideological contestation and that there will always be a constant struggle over the
sign.33 Bakhtin argued that in our social interactions we would start
from the accumulated language material, which is inevitably ideologically loaded—we then proceed with our dialogue in certain social circumstances, using speech genres and specific utterances.34
His observations certainly resonate in the digital world of social media where individuals communicate through posting and reposting
of words, images, and videos each chosen with its semiotic freight
and particular connotations understood within that community. Annemarie Bridy notes that:
For Bakhtin, intertextuality is an intrinsic property of
language because the words a writer chooses “are already populated with the social intentions of others.”
The writer “compels them to serve his own new intentions, to serve a second master.”35
Stuart Hall has defined the taking of an existing meaning and
reappropriating it for new meanings as “trans-coding”36 and

31

JOHN FISKE, TELEVISION CULTURE 239 (1st ed. 1987). Fiske examines the construction
of meanings by the audience, which plays with parodies and actively subverts the dominant
encoding of the sign. See also Sonia K. Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, 84 WASH. U. L.
REV. 489, 489–90 (2006).
32
See generally MIKHAIL M. BAKHTIN, SPEECH GENRES AND OTHER LATE ESSAYS (Vern
W. McGee, trans., Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist eds., 1994); MICHAEL E. GARDINER,
THE DIALOGICS OF CRITIQUE: M.M. BAKHTIN AND THE THEORY OF IDEOLOGY (1992).
33
BAKHTIN, supra note 32, at 76–77; GARDINER, supra note 32, at 7.
34
LESZEK KOCZANOWICZ, POLITICS OF DIALOGUE: NON-CONSENSUAL DEMOCRACY AND
CRITICAL COMMUNITY 77 (2015).
35
Annemarie Bridy, Fearless Girl Meets Charging Bull: Copyright and the Regulation
of Intertextuality, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 293, 302 (2019) (internal citations omitted).
36
Stuart Hall, The Spectacle of the “Other”, in REPRESENTATION: CULTURAL
REPRESENTATIONS AND SIGNIFYING PRACTICES 223, 270 (Stuart Hall ed., 1997). The term
“transfunctionalize” has also been used to describe how subcultures assign new and often
contradictory meanings to signs as understood by mainstream society. PAUL NATHANSON,
OVER THE RAINBOW: THE WIZARD OF OZ AS A SECULAR MYTH OF AMERICA 343 (1991).
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explained that repressed groups may use trans-coding strategies to
reverse stereotypes, substitute negative portrayals with positive
ones, or contest subordinate representations from within.37 Such a
description possibly falls within Hal Foster’s description of the
countercultural movement which seeks to counter the myth; such
“‘myth-robbery’ seeks to restore the original sign for its social context or to break apart the abstracted mythical sign and to reinscribe
it in a countermythical system.”38 However, Foster views the “subcultural” practice to be different from the countercultural in that it
“recodes signs rather than poses a revolutionary practice of its
own.”39 Despite the differences, both countercultural and subcultural recodings are arguably applicable to the transformative use
doctrine in copyright law.
In his study of digital fandom, Paul Booth advances his thesis of
a “philosophy of playfulness” which he observes to be prevalent in
the individual’s use of today’s digital technology.40 Drawing on
Bakhtin’s writings, Booth postulates that on the internet, individuals
entering into a “carnivalesque atmosphere subsume their identities,
join a collectivity, and participate in a textual freedom.”41 Bakhtin’s
earlier interest in a purely textual form of dialogism (such as in his
1929 study of Fyodor Dostoevsky) soon evolved into a preoccupation with the transgressive potential of a constellation of cultural
practices, rituals, and symbols designated as the “carnivalesque”
that is concerned with “images of symbolic degradation and the
‘bringing down to earth’ of hegemonic values, ideas, and sentiments
via the evocation of utopian community.”42 He initially developed
the concept of carnival while analyzing François Rabelais’s writings
and their connection to the popular laughing culture of the Renaissance. Bakhtin was exiled from the center of official Soviet culture
due to his involvement in an unofficial circle of philosophers, and
he was interested in writing about “the multiplicity of split-offs from
37

Hall, supra note 36, at 270–75.
HAL FOSTER, RECODINGS: ART, SPECTACLE, CULTURAL POLITICS 169 (1985).
39
Id. at 170.
40
PAUL BOOTH, DIGITAL FANDOM: NEW MEDIA STUDIES 2 (1st prtg. 2010).
41
Id. at 60. See also PAUL BOOTH, PLAYING FANS: NEGOTIATING FANDOM AND MEDIA IN
THE DIGITAL AGE 136–149 (2015).
42
Michael Gardiner, Bakhtin’s Carnival: Utopia as Critique, 3 UTOPIAN STUD., no. 2,
21, 28 (1992).
38
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the core” and “the conflict between the two forces, the centrifugal
and the centripetal” within the Soviet cultural system.43 According
to Bakhtin, the lively carnival ethos represented by folklore and folk
laughter stood in opposition to the official and serious church-sanctioned and feudal culture.44 This resulted in the carnival’s appearance as a direct response to medieval political theology.45 Bakhtin’s
notion of the carnival has been applied to studies of the hegemony
of the Roman Catholic Church, the Holy Roman Empire of the Renaissance, and Stalinism.46 Today, a parallel may be drawn with the
carnivalesque atmosphere on social media in contradistinction to the
more serious real world where intellectual property rights are more
rigorously and rigidly enforced. Renate Lachmann explains that the
ensemble of rites and symbols is subjugated to:
[t]he principle of laughter that organizes the carnival
is transtemporal and universal. Laughter rises above
and transcends the objects at which it is temporarily
aimed: official institutions and the sacral.47
It had been noted similarly that the carnival culture’s idea of
“transgression of cultural norms and values by subaltern groups, [is]
the ideal critical tool for approaching all kinds of social and material
interactions.”48 In her reading of Bakhtin, Elizabeth Rosenblatt has
observed that the medieval carnival has brought together a mélange
of clerics, schoolmen, and ordinary people “to engage in renewal
and recreation, providing temporary release from a rigid ideological
system”, thus creating “a temporary space for fantasy, radicalism,
and criticism of the upper strata.” 49 Indeed, Bakhtin’s conceptualization of the carnival is very much focused on how a temporary
upending of hierarchy is tolerated within a prescribed time and space
that is still very much governed by rules. In the carnival, strict social
and class roles are reversed or inverted through ritual spectacles and
43

Lachmann, supra note 7, at 116.
Id. at 118.
45
See id.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 123.
48
Chris Humphrey, Bakhtin and the Study of Popular Culture: Re-thinking Carnival as
a Historical and Analytical Concept, in MATERIALIZING BAKHTIN 164, 165 (Craig Brandist
& Galin Tihanov eds., 2000).
49
Rosenblatt, supra note 11, at 386.
44
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discourse that include profanities, parodies, pastiche, and mockery.50 The transgressive activities cloaked in a festive spirit allowed
the ordinary folk to talk back to the dominant culture and the power
czars, but it did not undermine or distort the broader framework of
class and political structure.51 Framing copyright law through this
lens, Rosenblatt argues:
[l]ike the carnivalesque, fair uses employ the communicative tools of the establishment to convey a
new, possibly contradictory meaning—a secular use
of sacred symbols, so to speak. The carnivalesque engages in dialogue by assigning a folk meaning to (religious or other authoritarian) signs, resisting a
power structure that would assign a monologic
meaning to those same signs.52
More specifically, David Tan, co-author of this Article, has previously mooted a more nuanced approach to the new media paradigm that posits cultural practices of fans as a form of “transformative play” within an interactive social and cultural space which offers exciting collaborative possibilities to authors and fans,53 approaching fair use through the viewpoint of the carnivalesque.54 It
has also been suggested that the law be more accepting of the antics
of the “prankster” in culture jamming where resistance is effected
“less through negating and opposing dominant rhetorics than by
playfully and provocatively folding existing cultural forms in on
themselves.”55 The authors agree with Rosenblatt that framing fair
use through a carnivalesque lens acknowledges “intertextual and relational nature of expression, but at the same time, the framework of

50

Mohammed & Trumpbour, supra note 10, at 3.
Rosenblatt, supra note 11, at 386.
52
Id. at 388.
53
David Tan, Fair Use and Transformative Play in the Digital Age, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN MEDIA AND ENTERTAINMENT 102, 130 (Megan
Richardson ed., 2017).
54
David Tan, De(Re)Constructing Narratives in Intellectual Property Law:
Transformative Play, Culture Jamming, and Poststructural Disruptions, 32 L. &
LITERATURE 75, 87 (2020).
55
Christine Harold, Pranking Rhetoric: “Culture Jamming” as Media Activism, 21
CRITICAL STUD. IN MEDIA COMMC’N. 189, 191 (2004).
51
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fair use is not a free-for-all.”56 However, Rosenblatt does not elucidate how conduct functioning as carnivalesque can be protected by
current fair use doctrine. Indeed, the four factors of fair use have to
carefully be weighed taking into account the public benefit of excusing/permitting the transgressive (infringing) behavior. The authors propose to build on Rosenblatt’s conception of the carnivalesque by considering how the creation and maintenance of the
online public persona in a social media environment can benefit
from the notion of a “digital carnivalesque.”
Three key characteristics of the carnivalesque are pertinent here.
First, the laughing culture of the carnival where official authority is
subverted by laughter and all carnival participants are friendly with
each other regardless of their social standing.57 Jesters are permitted
to speak their minds and real names are replaced by nicknames. Second, the material culture of pleasure and gluttony predominates in
the carnival as the participants obsess with sex, body parts, material
objects, and food.58 Third, the game culture presents a giddy psychedelia of repeated activities and rituals with rewards and prizes,
including the election of the mock king.59 One can immediately see
how a social media platform like Instagram embodies all three attributes. Individuals create an online persona using nicknames and
engage in familiar and intimate interactions with one another. The
most popular postings revolve around obsessions with celebrity, sex,
material objects, and food. Influencers are financially rewarded for
specific activities, as well as other participants for taking part in contests.60 In the Bakhtinian program of an ideal social life, the
56

Rosenblatt, supra note 11, at 390.
Gaufman, supra note 10, at 413 (internal citations omitted).
58
Id.
59
Id. at 414.
60
See, e.g., Gil Appel, Lauren Grewal, Rhonda Hadi, & Andrew T. Stephen, The Future
of Social Media in Marketing, 48 J. ACAD. MKTG. SCI. 79 (2020); Paul Jankowski, Gaming
Is The Best Social Media Platform For Brands To Reach Gen-Z, FORBES (June 1, 2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/pauljankowski/2020/06/01/gaming-is-the-best-socialmedia-platform-for-brands-to-reach-gen-z/ [https://perma.cc/3P8S-D3ER]; Paul Suciu,
Social Media Influencers—Still Worth the Money, FORBES (May 29, 2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/petersuciu/2020/05/29/social-media-influencers—stillworth-the-money/ [https://perma.cc/7Y7J-ZVPL]; Audrey Conklin, How Much Money Do
Social Media Influencers Make?,
FOX BUSINESS (Mar. 11, 2020),
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perpetual fluctuation of the traditional carnival discourse from pathos to grotesque, or from laughter to seriousness, precludes the appropriation of the empty space of the carnival feast by any permanent symbol.61 Importantly, the digital carnivalesque cannot be an
embodied utopia as intellectual property rules will continue to operate in this online milieu, but we can regard this carnival with its ongoing utterances and dialogue as a universal phenomenon reflecting
human nature with immense potential for freedom of expression that
ought to be safeguarded.
The US Supreme Court in both Golan v Holder and Eldred v
Ashcroft held that “the ‘traditional contours’ of copyright protection,
i.e., the ‘idea/expression dichotomy’ and the ‘fair use’ defense . . .
are recognized in our jurisprudence as ‘built-in First Amendment
accommodations.’”62 In particular, the fair use defense as codified
in 17 USC §107 “allows the public to use not only facts and ideas
contained in a copyrighted work, but also [the author’s] expression
itself in certain circumstances.”63 It is unsurprising that in the context of a robust free speech culture emboldened by the First Amendment, U.S. courts have interpreted the notion of transformative use
liberally—and consequentially the fair use defense—when the freedom of speech would be unduly constrained by the enforcement of
the rights of copyright owners. One of the most significant contributions that semiotics can bring to copyright law is in the analysis
of fair use. In copyright fair use, the pertinent inquiry is whether the
secondary work “adds something new, with a further purpose or
different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning,
or message.”64
As Tan has pointed out,65 Brian Holland finds that certain aspects of the critical theories aligned with the law and literature
movement are useful to a more expansive model of transformative

https://www.foxbusiness.com/lifestyle/social-media-influencer-pay
[https://perma.cc/ZX59-DFTJ].
61
KOCZANOWICZ, supra note 34, at 84–85.
62
Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 328 (2012); Eldred v. Aschroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219
(2003).
63
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219.
64
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
65
Tan, supra note 54.
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fair use that addresses both monopoly incentive and accommodation
concerns. He explains:
First, these critical theories shift the focus away from
works of authorship and toward audience engagement with the text. This mitigates the tendency to
overvalue, through a monopoly interest, those who
most closely fit the image of the romantic author and
to undervalue both prior works and the audience.
Second, these critical theories acknowledge that an
author does not control the meaning of a work. Instead, meaning is determined, at least in part, through
intertextual processes. This opens the door to a reconsideration of meaning-making and the role of audiences in that process, with significant implications
for copyright doctrine.66
Holland postulates that “the prevailing conception of transformativeness [in copyright fair use] is one of romantic authorship, evidenced by a defendant’s authorial purpose or activity” and proposes
an approach “grounded in social semiotic theory [that] attempts to
account for the multiple and divergent meanings created as various
interpretive communities engage a particular work.”67 However,
contrary to Holland’s observations that the U.S. courts currently focus on the degree to which a defendant has engaged in authorial activity in the fair use analysis,68 the current approach of the Second
and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals appears to be able to accommodate the shifting of the transformativeness inquiry from locating
an authorial presence or authorial activity, to one of reader interpretation, i.e. whether one might reasonably perceive the creation of
“new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings.”69 As Laura Heymann points out, ultimately, the question is
whether the resulting work “is transformative in its meaning—that
66

H. Brian Holland, Social Semiotics in the Fair Use Analysis, 24 HARV. J. LAW & TECH.
335, 358 (2011).
67
Id. at 348.
68
Id. at 354–56.
69
See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d
244 (2d Cir. 2006); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. ComicMix, LLC, 983 F.3d 443 (9th Cir.
2020); Seltzer v. Green Day, 729 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2013).

2021] COPYRIGHT FAIR USE AND THE DIGITAL CARNIVALESQUE

879

is, whether the reader perceives the second copy as signifying something different from the first.”70 When one analyzes a work of copyright, one can potentially read it semiotically as embodying a unity
of modern cultural meanings capable of being opposed or resisted
(through “countercultural” means such as parody), or one can regard
it as possessing polysemous qualities which may be contested or disrupted (through “subcultural” practice such as bricolage or pastiche). Uses that comment on or present a different way of viewing
familiar iconography, societal archetypes, public obsessions, and
majoritarian beliefs—typical carnivalesque conduct—all fall within
the First Amendment categories of protected speech, such as political speech, art, entertainment, and matters of public interest.71 Parody may be viewed as contributing valuable commentary and criticism to the marketplace of ideas, or advancing democratic debate on
matters of public interest through the use of irreverent humor.72 Various forms of appropriation art, which can include memes on social
media and altered image posts on Instagram, can be viewed as ideological critiques that take or hijack dominant words and images to
create insubordinate, counter messages.73 Furthermore, the participatory theory of the First Amendment supports the protection of the
making of “representations about self, identity, community, solidarity, and difference” or the articulation of political and social aspirations using these copyright signs within a “dialogic democracy.”74
Within this carnivalesque, it may be argued that fair use clearly advances the marketplace of ideas and the democratic rationale
70

Laura A. Heymann, Everything is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response,
31 COLUM. J. LAW & THE ARTS 445, 455 (2008). However, this observation is not
unproblematic. Holland notes that:
Courts have come to assume, however, that those messages and meanings
reside in the mind and intentions of the “author,” that those messages and
meanings are transmitted from the author to the audience, and that certain
segments of the audience either “get it” or do not. But this paradigm
misconceives the process by which “meaning” is realized. Meaning is not
controlled, transmitted, or even consistent. It is, instead, negotiated and
actualized in engagement with the audience, or, more appropriately, audiences.
Holland, supra note 66, at 361. See also Laura A. Heymann, Reasonable Appropriation
and Reader Response, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 343 (2019).
71
Tan, supra note 15, at 344.
72
Id. at 345.
73
Id. at 348.
74
Id. at 378–79.
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through the creation of “new information” and “new insights and
understandings,” as well as the self-fulfillment function through the
creation of “new aesthetics.”75
B. Fair Use in the 21st Century
Justice Story’s test in Folsom v. Marsh is widely considered to
be the origin of fair use in the U.S..76 Section 107 of the Copyright
Act 1976 permits use of copyrighted works “for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research,” with consideration of a non-exhaustive list of four factors:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
non-profit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted works.77
These factors will be examined in turn below.
1. Purpose and Character of the Use
Pierre Leval, then a Judge of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, published an influential article
in 1990 that considered “whether imprecision—the absence of a
clear standard—in the fair use doctrine [was] a strength or a weakness.”78 Leval noted that “throughout the development of the fair
use doctrine, courts had failed to fashion a set of governing principles or values”79 but he was concerned that fair use “should be perceived not as a disorderly basket of exceptions to the rules of copyright, nor as a departure from the principles governing that body of
law, but rather as a rational, integral part of copyright.”80 Leval advocated instilling a coherent and useful set of principles in the fair
75
76
77
78
79
80

Id. at 358.
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 349 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
17 U.S.C. § 107.
Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990).
Id. at 1105.
Id. at 1107.
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use doctrine, such that “the use must be of a character that serves the
copyright objective of stimulating productive thought and public instruction without excessively diminishing the incentives for creativity.”81 In his analysis of the four statutory fair use factors, Leval was
of the view that factor one—the “purpose and character of the
use”—is the “soul of fair use.”82 Explaining that this consideration
raises the question of whether the secondary use “fulfil[s] the objective of copyright law to stimulate creativity for public illumination,”83 he emphasized that the answer turns primarily on whether,
and to what extent, the challenged use is transformative. Leval
frames the inquiry as follows:
The use must be productive and must employ the
quoted matter in a different manner or for a different
purpose from the original . . . [If] the secondary use
adds value to the original—if the quoted matter is
used as raw material, transformed in the creation of
new information, new aesthetics, new insights and
understandings—this is the very type of activity that
the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society.84
Leval also provided some examples of transformative use which
included criticizing the quoted work, exposing the character of
the original author, summarizing an idea argued in the original
in order to defend or rebut it, parody, symbolism, and aesthetic
declarations.85
The phrase “transformative use” has catapulted into prominence
in fair use jurisprudence ever since the Supreme Court in 1994 embraced transformativeness as the heart of fair use in Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music Inc.86 The decision is important in its emphasis on
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Id. at 1110.
Id. at 1116.
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Id. at 1111.
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Id. (internal citations omitted).
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Id.
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Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). The controversial rap
group 2 Live Crew sampled the distinctive bassline from Roy Orbison’s original hit song
Pretty Woman, used the same title in their parody song, and the romantic lyrics were
replaced with lyrics about a big hairy woman and her exploits.
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how a highly transformative use of an original work may qualify the
secondary infringing work for fair use protection even if the latter
was commercial in nature, rebutting earlier presumptions in cases
like Harper & Row Publishers v Nation Enterprises87 and Sony
Corp of America v Universal City Studios.88 While all four statutory
fair use factors are supposed to be weighed together to determine
whether a use is fair, the first factor has largely dominated the analysis in the last three decades since the Supreme Court in Campbell
endorsed transformative use doctrine (a concept which to which
section 107 does not even explicitly refer).89 In his empirical
study of U.S. copyright decisions up to January 1, 2017, Jiarui Liu
concluded:
A finding of transformative use overrides findings of
commercial purpose and bad faith under factor one,
makes irrelevant the issue of whether the original
work is creative or unpublished under factor two,
stretches the extent of copying permitted under factor
three towards 100% verbatim reproduction, and precludes the evidence on damage to the primary or derivative market under factor four even though there
exists a well-functioning market for the use.90
The Supreme Court in Campbell held that a work will be transformative to the extent the new work “adds something new, with a
further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”91 The extent to which a use is transformative can reduce the weight given to other factors such as commerciality,92 because highly transformative secondary uses do not
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Harper & Row v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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See generally Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of US Copyright Fair Use Opinions,
1978–2005, 156 U. PENN. L. REV. 549 (2008); Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO
ST. L. J. 47 (2012); Jiarui Liu, An Empirical Study of Transformative Use in Copyright
Law, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 163 (2019).
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Liu, supra note 89, at 240.
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Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
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Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580. However, Judge Leval noted recently in Capitol Records,
LLC v ReDigi Inc., 910 F.3d 649, 661 (2d Cir. 2018):
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provide a market substitute for the original work. The decision appeared to have deemphasized the importance of the fourth factor in
the evaluation of fair use, and most of the lower courts’ decisions in
the aftermath of Campbell seemed to proceed on the basis that “if
transformative, then fair use.”93 In almost thirty years since Leval
urged courts to adopt transformation as a guiding principle of fair
use and following its endorsement in Campbell, the transformative
use doctrine has undergone a remarkable judicial expansion to include virtually any “creation of new information, new aesthetics,
new insights and understandings.”94
While parody appeared to occupy an exalted position in the annals of fair use after Campbell, it becomes clearer from the mid2000s onwards in a series of Circuit Court decisions that courts
should not be fixated with unnaturally distinguishing parody from
satire, or locating a critical commentary on the original work, when
assessing the first factor of fair use.95 The complexity of defining
parody has been highlighted in many scholarly writings.96 In her
masterful analysis of the history of the parody genre, Sabine Jacques
observes that “parody is often used interchangeably with terms such
as pastiche, caricature, satire, irony, imitation, plagiarism, and burlesque.”97 In particular, parodies and satires are not hermetically

[W]hile the mere fact of a commercial motivation rarely pushes the first factor
determination against fair use (as so many canonical fair uses, such as book
reviews; quotation of prominent figures in news reports, news commentary,
and history books; the performance of parodic plays, are all commercial), in
some circumstances a commercial motive will weigh against a finding of fair
use under Factor One.
(Citation omitted).
93
Jane C. Ginsburg, Fair Use in the United States: Transformed, Deformed, Reformed?,
SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 265, 277 (2020). Ginsburg questions whether the pendulum of
transformative use has begun to return to a more balanced fair use analysis but cautions
that renewed emphasis on the fourth factor risks simply inverting the test (“The formula ‘if
transformative work/purpose, then no market harm’ meets its corollary: ‘If commercial and
not transformative, then market harm.’ Thus, fair use continues to reduce to a one-factor
test, but one that cuts both ways.”). Id. at 287.
94
See Castle Rock Ent., Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp, Inc. 150 F.3d 132, 143 (2d Cir. 1998)
(quoting Leval, supra note 78, at 1111).
95
See, e.g., Amy Lai, Copyright Law and Its Parody Defense: Multiple Legal
Perspectives, 4 NYU J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 311 (2015).
96
See, e.g., SABINE JACQUES, THE PARODY EXCEPTION IN COPYRIGHT LAW 1–36 (2019).
97
Id. at 7.
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separated from one another, and they can blend in a single work
called a “satiric parody.” Referring to Mattel v. MCA Records,98
Jacques points out that the song Barbie Girl by the Danish band
Aqua “parodies the famous fashion doll manufactured by Mattel, but
at the same time, it is a satiric commentary on the ‘blond bimbo’
image of women in today’s society.”99 Simon Dentith contends that
it is impossible to encapsulate parody in a single definition, and suggests that it broadly “includes any cultural practice which provides
a relatively polemical allusive imitation of another cultural production or practice.”100
In 2006, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Blanch v. Koons
held that appropriation artist Jeff Koons’ use of Andrea Blanch’s
fashion photograph was fair use even though he did not comment on
the original work, rather using it “as fodder for his commentary on
the social and aesthetic consequences of mass media.”101 The Second Circuit expressly disagreed that comment or criticism of the
original work is required to show transformative use, and instead
inquired whether the original work was used in the “creation of new
information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings.”102 In
2013, the Second Circuit reiterated in Cariou v. Prince that a work
need not comment on the original to be transformative, and went
even further to state that transformativeness will be judged on how
the work may “reasonably be perceived” by the audience, rather
than relying on an artist’s stated intent. 103 Whether a secondary use
is parody or satire is of greater importance in jurisdictions with
closed-ended fair dealing provisions such as those in the United
Kingdom, Canada, and Australia than under present U.S. fair use
doctrine. Since 2006, the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of

98
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Appeals in a consistent lineage of decisions such as Blanch v.
Koons,104 Cariou v. Prince,105 Seltzer v. Green Day,106 TCA Television Corp. v. McCollum,107 and Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. ComicMix108 have avoided discussing specifically whether an infringing
use was parody or satire, instead applying the “creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings” test for
transformativeness. Even so, a parodic or satirical purpose may permit greater copying under the third factor analysis,109 and reduce the
relevant market harm under the fourth factor.110 Largely in line with
Pamela Samuelson’s policy clusters,111 Tan has conducted a review
of US fair use cases post-Campbell, identifying five broad and
sometimes overlapping categories of transformative uses identified
as demonstrating a change in the “purpose” or “character” under 17
U.S.C § 107:
(1) Directly commenting on or criticizing the original
work, or targeting the original work for ridicule or
parody;
(2) Using the original work to comment on something else or in a satire, but the secondary work nonetheless contains some underlying critical relevance
to the original work;
(3) Recontextualizing the original work without significant modification but changing the meaning of
the original work (e.g., Andy Warhol’s appropriation
art);
104

467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006).
714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).
106
Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2013).
107
TCA Television Corp. v. McCollum, 839 F.3d 168 (2d Cir 2016).
108
Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. ComicMix LLC, 983 F.3d 443 (9th Cir. 2020). The
infringing work Oh, the Places You’ll Boldly Go! which was a mash-up of characters from
Star Trek and Seussian landscapes, was separately considered by the court on whether it
was a parody and in the alternative, whether it had the “benchmarks of transformative use.”
Id. at 451–61.
109
See e.g., TCA, 839 F.3d 168 (ruling that a non-parodic and non-satirical verbatim use
of a famous comedy routine Who’s on First? in a play was not fair use since it had the same
purpose as the original).
110
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994) (“[T]here is no
protectable derivative market for criticism.”).
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(4) Changing the purpose of the original work within
an expressive context (e.g., from entertainment to education or research); and
(5) Changing the purpose of the original work within
a technological context and with significant social
benefit. 112
More recently, in a spate of fair use decisions involving technology as opposed to the visual and performing arts contexts, the Circuit Courts have focused more closely on the statutory text of
whether there was a change in “purpose” or “character” when determining fair use.113 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in TCA Television Corp. v. McCollum has commented that the generous view
of what might constitute transformative use (and therefore fair use)
might have hit its “high-water mark” in Cariou.114 Judge Pierre
Leval, now sitting on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, also retreated noticeably from endorsing the transformative use talisman in
Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., commenting that the fourth
factor is “undoubtedly the single most important element of fair
use.”115 Ginsburg notes that during this period of the first factor primacy, while courts have followed a nearly formulaic “if
112

Tan, supra note 15, at 332–34. See also Liu, supra note 89, at 204–10.
See, e.g., Authors Guild Inc., et al. v. Google, Inc. 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015)
(allowing researchers access to snippets in Google Books program, which scanned entire
contents of books but allowed only minimal access to the text of those books, was fair use);
Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2018) [hereinafter
“TVEyes”] (allowing subscribers to search and view substantial portions of copyrighted
news broadcasts is not fair use); Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., 910 F.3d 649 (2d
Cir. 2018) (ruling that resale of digital music files is not fair use); Oracle Am., Inc. v.
Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding the purpose of the API packages in
Android is the same as the purpose of the packages in the Java platform and that Google
made no alteration to the expressive content or message of the copyrighted material);
Brammer v. Violent Hues Prods., LLC, 922 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 2019) (finding that posting
a cropped photograph, without a change in purpose, is not fair use); VHT, Inc. v. Zillow
Grp., Inc., 918 F. 3d 723 (9th Cir. 2019) (finding that searchable full-sized real estate
images displayed for the same purpose as the original photographs is not fair use).
114
TCA TV Corp. v. McCollum, 839 F.3d at 181. Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals was also highly critical of the Cariou decision: Kienitz v. Sconnie
Nation, LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014) (“We’re skeptical of Cariou’s approach,
because asking exclusively whether something is ‘transformative’ not only replaces the list
in § 107 but also could override 17 U.S.C. § 106(2), which protects derivative works.”).
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910 F.3d at 662 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 566 (1985)).
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transformative, then fair use,”116 one should be cautious against flipping this single-factor analysis to “[i]f commercial and not transformative, then market harm.”117 The resurgence of the primacy of
the fourth factor in last few years will be discussed below.
Rosenblatt’s excellent analysis will not be repeated here. The
authors agree that the “carnival of fair use is extraordinarily diverse
and can include, for example, criticism, parody, satire, data-mining,
fanworks, collage, and scholarship.”118 Viewing cases like Campbell and Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.119 through a Bakhtinian lens, Bridy locates the presence of a “confrontational dialogism” and finds that the theme of “intertextual inversion” runs
through these cases.120 The commonality in cases like Campbell,
Blanch, Cariou, and Authors Guild is that they involve defendants
using the works of the owners with a purpose or character different
from what the owners intended.
2. Nature of the Work
This factor is virtually never dispositive in a fair use analysis but
copying from factual/compilation works is more likely to be found
fair use—whereas taking from creative, artistic, and fictional works
will be less so.121 This is in line with copyright’s protection of
116

Ginsburg, supra note 93, at 277.
Id. at 287.
118
Rosenblatt, supra note 11, at 389.
119
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
120
Bridy, supra note 35, at 319–20. Bridy also comments: “By specifically identifying
criticism and commentary as examples of protected second-degree uses, the Copyright Act
discourages the use of copyright to enforce authorial monologism in cases involving
unfaithful continuations and other disputatious hypertexts.” Id. at 321.
121
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1993) (“This factor calls for
recognition that some works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection than
others, with the consequence that fair use is more difficult to establish when the former
works are copied.”); Brammer v. Violent Hues Prods., LLC, 922 F.3d 255, 267 (4th Cir.
2019) (“As a basic matter, photographs are ‘generally viewed as creative, aesthetic
expressions of a scene or image’ and have long received thick copyright protection. This
is so even though photographs capture images of reality. ‘Simply because a photo
documents an event does not turn a pictorial representation into a factual recitation . . .
Photos that we now regard as iconic often document an event—whether the flight of the
Wright Brothers’ airplane, the sailor’s kiss in Times Square on V-J Day, the first landing
on the moon, or the fall of the Berlin Wall.’”) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Monge
v. Maya Mags., Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1177 (9th Cir. 2012)).
117
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expression, rather than facts or ideas. The Supreme Court in Campbell held that the second factor “calls for recognition that some
works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection than
others,”122 noting that parodies “almost invariably copy publicly
known, expressive works.”123 Additionally, use of unpublished
works narrows the scope of fair use.124 Memes often make use of
widely known photographs and audiovisual works, which belong to
the “core” of copyright protection, but this factor is unlikely to be
significant in the fair use analysis.
3. Amount and Substantiality Taken
The amount and substantiality taken from the original work is
an important consideration in the fair use analysis. This third factor
was prominently considered in cases such as Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprise and more recently in TCA v.
McCollum. In Harper & Row, the Supreme Court held the defendant’s taking of some 300 words from President Ford’s memoir was
not fair use.125 Though representing a small number of words in relation to the whole, the Supreme Court held that those amounted to
“the heart of the book,” which militated against finding fair use.126
The Supreme Court held in Campbell that substantial taking from
the original may “reveal a dearth of transformative character or purpose under the first factor, or a greater likelihood of market harm
under the fourth.”127
Secondary use of the entire or significant portions of copyrighted works as the “raw material” for social commentary without
direct bearing on or criticism of the original will have to overcome
or counterbalance this factor, which would generally weigh against
a finding of fair use. This discomfort that courts may have in allowing too much leeway to non-parodic works was evident in how the
Second Circuit could not decide as a matter of law that five of
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See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 256 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal citation
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Richard Prince’s works, which reproduced the entire photographs
by Patrick Cariou with minimal alterations, were fair use as it was
unclear whether the alterations amounted to a sufficient transformation of the original work of art such that the new work was transformative.128 Courts will also consider the broader public good provided by the new use and some uses that necessitate taking of the
whole work may nonetheless qualify as fair use as there was clearly
a new purpose.129 Under this factor, a parodic purpose or one which
directly criticizes or comments on the original work may justify reproductions of entire or significant portions of copyrighted works.130
4. Effect on Market and Potential Market for the Work
The Supreme Court held in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios
that the fourth factor is “perhaps the most important” of the fair use
analysis.131 Courts today consider the extent to which new work supersedes the original, the effects on the licensing market, and the
impairment on the copyright owner’s exclusive right to authorize
derivative works.132 Fromer points out that before Campbell, the Supreme Court’s treatment of market effects tended to be “tentative

128

Cariou, 714 F.3d at 710–11.
See e.g., Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 216–17 (2d Cir. 2015). See also
Bill Graham Archives, LLC v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 610–12 (2d Cir.
2006) (finding a “transformative purpose” in the complete reproduction of seven
copyrighted images).
130
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580 (“For the purposes of copyright law, the nub of the
definitions, and the heart of any parodist’s claim to quote from existing material, is the use
of some elements of a prior author’s composition to create a new one that, at least in part,
comments on that author’s works.”). However, the Supreme Court also said,
The fact that parody can claim legitimacy for some appropriation does not, of
course, tell either parodist or judge much about where to draw the line. Like a
book review quoting the copyrighted material criticized, parody may or may
not be fair use, and petitioners’ suggestion that any parodic use is
presumptively fair has no more justification in law or fact than the equally
hopeful claim that any use for news reporting should be presumed fair.
Id. at 581.
131
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 476 (1984).
132
See, e.g., Cariou, 714 F.3d at 708–09; Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 223–25; Fox News
Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 169, 181; Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc.,
910 F.3d 649, 662–63; Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. ComicMix, LLC, 983 F.3d 443, 458–61
(9th Cir. 2020).
129
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and embryonic.”133 In the span of a year, the Supreme Court decided
Sony and Harper & Row. In Sony, the court considered the potential
market for pre-recorded videotapes too speculative and the noncommercial nature of time-shifting enabled by home videotape recording.134 The court in Harper & Row considered the direct evidence of market harm resulting from the “scooping” of key excerpts
of President Ford’s memoir by The Nation newspaper in its finding
against fair use.135
Citing Sony, Harper & Row, and Folsom v. Marsh, the Supreme
Court in Campbell held that the fourth factor “requires courts to consider not only the extent of market harm caused by the particular
actions of the alleged infringer, but also ‘whether unrestricted and
widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant . . .
would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market’ for the original.”136 However, Justice Souter’s emphatic pronouncement in Campbell has had the (perhaps unintended) effect of
amplifying the ascendancy of the first over the fourth factor: “[T]he
more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance
of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”137
Fromer notes that transformative works including parodies are
“unlikely to cause relevant market harm to a copyright owner, even
if they can harm the market for the copyrighted work in unrelated
ways.”138 Moreover, since works that transform existing material are
directly connected to those works, they “can draw attention to, enhance, or affirm the work’s role in the marketplace.”139 Ginsburg
rightly observes that decisions following Campbell often concluded
that “if the use was ‘transformative’, then the market within which
it operated was also ‘transformative’, and, accordingly, non-

133

Jeanne C. Fromer, Market Effects Bearing on Fair Use. 90 WASH. L. REV. 615, 625
(2015).
134
Sony, 464 U.S. at 454, 484–85.
135
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 602–03.
136
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (internal citations
omitted).
137
Id. at 579.
138
Fromer, supra note 134, at 629.
139
Id. at 630.
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competing.”140 However, recent decisions from the Second and
Ninth Circuit Courts seem to mark a renaissance of the fourth factor.141 Ginsburg argues that this renewed emphasis on the fourth factor could risk simply reversing the formula that transformative
works do not impact the market of the original.142
Judge Pierre Leval, who authored the iconic article that resulted
in the Supreme Court articulating the transformative use doctrine,
was sitting as a judge for the Second Circuit in Capitol Records,
LLC v. ReDigi Inc. when he reiterated the Supreme Court’s description of the fourth factor in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises as “undoubtedly the single most important element of
fair use.”143 Citing Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, LLC and
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., he correctly observed that the fourth
factor is a consideration of whether the secondary use brings a competing substitute to the marketplace, and “the more the objective of
the secondary use differs from the original, the less likely it will be
to supplant the commercial market for the original.”144 Judge Leval
held that ReDigi’s minimally transformative purpose fell short of
TVEyes’ failed assertion of fair use, and competed in an identical
market as the original works.145 These recent decisions suggest that
the influential Second Circuit has begun to reemphasize the fourth
factor over the hitherto dominance of the first factor in a fair use
analysis. The Seventh Circuit has already eschewed the application
of the transformative use doctrine and has asserted the importance
of the fourth factor.146
In 2019, the Ninth Circuit in VHT v. Zillow held that Zillow’s
reproduction of VHT’s high-definition photographs was a non140

Ginsburg, supra note 93, at 268.
Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., 910 F.3d 649, 662–63 (2d Cir. 2018); Dr. Seuss
Enters., L.P. v. ComicMix, LLP, 983 F.3d 443, 458–61 (9th Cir. 2020).
142
Ginsburg, supra note 93, at 287 (“In other words, ‘transformativeness’ may remain
decisive, but the equation has flipped. The formula ‘if transformative work/purpose, then
no market harm’ meets its corollary: ‘if commercial and not transformative, then market
harm.’ Thus, fair use continues to reduce to a one-factor test, but one that cuts both ways.”)
143
Capitol Records, 910 F.3d at 662 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985)).
144
Id. 910 F.3d at 662 (internal citations omitted).
145
Id. at 663.
146
Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014).
141
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transformative use that usurped the original market for the photographs, noting that “the label ‘search engine’ is not a talismanic term
that serves as an on-off switch as to fair use.”147 In the same year,
the Fourth Circuit also held in Brammer v. Violent Hues Prods that
the commercial and non-transformative reproduction of Brammer’s
photo impacted its licensing market and was therefore not fair
use.148 In 2020, the Ninth Circuit found that ComicMix created,
without seeking permission or a license, a non-transformative commercial mash-up work that targets and usurps the potential market
for Dr. Seuss’s classic book, Oh, the Places You’ll Go!.149 It was
pertinent that Seuss often “collaborates with other creators, including in projects that mix different stories and characters . . . [and that]
Seuss routinely receives requests for collaborations and licenses,
and has entered into various collaborations that apply Seuss’s works
to new creative contexts.”150 Ginsburg argues that rather than a simple rebalancing in favor of the fourth factor which risks introducing
other distortions to the analysis, courts should examine “the amount
of the copying (factor 3) in light of how the allegedly transformative
work treats the copied material (factor 1) [which] should help determine the substitution effect (factor 4) of the portion taken.”151 If the
trend towards a renewed emphasis on the fourth factor continues,
one might expect courts to place greater weight on the substitution
effects or effects on potential derivative and licensing markets that
a secondary use impinges on. Transformative use will continue to
be an important consideration that alters the effects of a secondary
use on the potential market for a work, but uses that copy to “avoid
the drudgery in working up something fresh” or “merely . . . to get
attention”152 are unlikely to succeed in their claim, especially when
what the new use delivers is substantially similar to the original expression. Moving forward, transformative use as a juridical concept
is also unlikely to have the trump effect which it has enjoyed for
over the last three decades.

147
148
149
150
151
152

VHT, Inc. v. Zillow Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d 723, 742 (9th Cir. 2019).
Brammer v. Violent Hues Prods., LLC., 922 F.3d 255, 268–69 (4th Cir. 2019).
Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. ComicMix, LLC, 983 F.3d 443, 461 (9th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 460.
Ginsburg, supra note 93, at 293.
Campbell v. Rose-Acuff Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994).
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II. INTERNET MEMES AND DIGITAL CULTURE
Memes usually alter the meaning of the underlying works
through semiotic recontextualization, recoding, or visual editing, but
they often do so in a way that does not mesh well with copyright law
that is developed for dissemination of works through traditional intermediaries. For this reason, they provide an excellent example of
how courts and legislators have struggled to adapt to changing user
behavior in an intercommunicative digital world where the line blurs
between creator and consumer.153 Memes have become a fundamental mode of expression in digital culture, embodying the transformative qualities that fair use is intended to protect. This Part seeks to
establish an operational definition and understanding of memes as
they relate to fair use, and to situate them within digital culture.
A. Defining Memes
The term “meme” was first introduced by biologist Richard
Dawkins in his book The Selfish Gene in 1976.154 The word meme
derives from the Greek mimema, meaning something which is imitated, which Dawkins shortened to rhyme with gene. Dawkins defined memes as a small cultural units of transmission, analogous to
genes, which are spread from person to person by copying or imitation that include specific signifiers such as melodies, catchphrases
and clothing fashions.155 According to Limor Shifman, like genes,
memes are replicators that are constantly subject to variation, competition, selection, and retention.156 As different memes compete
with one another for attention, only those that are suited to their sociocultural environment are propagated quickly and successfully,
i.e. going viral. Michele Knobel and Colin Lankshear contend that
the word meme is employed by Internet users mainly to describe the
rapid uptake and spread of a ‘‘particular idea presented as a written

153

Paul Booth argues that fans’ treatment of copyrighted works “transgress the line
between production and consumption, and more importantly, alter our interpretation of that
boundary.” BOOTH, supra note 40, at 180.
154
RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 171 (1976).
155
Limor Shifman, Memes in a Digital World: Reconciling with a Conceptual
Troublemaker, 18 J. COMPUT.-MEDIATED COMM. 362, 363 (2013).
156
Id.
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text, image, language ‘move’, or some other unit of cultural
‘stuff’.’’157
Internet memes defy rigid categorization, but establishing a definition is necessary to analyze them through the lens of copyright
law.158 Bradley Wiggins defines internet memes as:
[a] remixed, iterated message that can be rapidly diffused by members of participatory digital culture for
the purpose of satire, parody, critique, or other discursive activity. An internet meme is a more specific
term for the various iterations it represents, such as
image macro memes, GIFs, hashtags, video memes,
and more. Its function is to posit an argument, visually, in order to commence, extend, counter, or influence a discourse.159
Shifman, in analyzing the “Leave Britney Alone” meme example, found that hardly any of the ideas conveyed by the original
video were further circulated by its imitators, and that the imitations
stress a different communicative role.160 In the propagation of internet memes, overt reproduction of the original image is accompanied
by new elements which may be images or text which introduces a
different take on the original event.161

157

MICHELE KNOBEL & COLIN LANKSHEAR, A NEW LITERACIES SAMPLER 202 (2nd ed.
2007).
158
Bradley Wiggins notes that the modern conception of meme originated with
evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins, who created the neologism as a noun to convey
cultural transmission that fully captures the connection between culture and memory.
Wiggins distinguishes internet memes from Dawkins’ formulation based on the conception
of imitation: the essence of internet memes is marked not by imitation, “but by the capacity
to propose or counter a discursive argument through visual and often also verbal interplay”
and their power to inhere a critical component of political and social interaction. Internet
memes can vary widely in their discursiveness, but considered with the medium’s semiotic
potential, may serve inter alia as commentary on the absurdity of the human condition or
as an “in-joke” within a particular internet subculture. See WIGGINS, supra note 18, at 1.
Shifman also provides a comprehensive analysis of internet memes, isolating three
dimensions of cultural items that people can potentially imitate: content, form, and stance.
Shifman, supra note 156, at 367.
159
WIGGINS, supra note 18, at 11.
160
Shifman, supra note 156, at 370–71.
161
Id. at 371.
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For the purposes of this Article, “internet meme” and “meme”
refer interchangeably to the same phenomenon. An important aspect
of the meme format is that it leaves certain premises of an argument
unstated, allowing the audience to implant their own knowledge and
lived experience into the expression of the meme. As such, it supports further expression and semiotic richness rather than being a
mere imitation of an earlier idea. This reliance on unstated premises
also has the effect of making memes of obscure subcultures arcane
to non-members. This definition is not all-encompassing of what
might be popularly considered a “meme.” Other phenomena exist
within digital culture adjacent to the internet meme or have memetic
qualities. This Article focuses solely on audiovisual memes as those
memetic behaviors that fall outside the above definition are generally self-referential of internet culture, and will generally not be subject to claims of infringement in the same manner as those that draw
on external referents.162
Memes are fundamentally communicative. For the purpose of
fair use analysis, memes may be grouped into four broad categories,
three of which engage significant copyright concerns:
(1) Image Macros, which caption direct reproductions of existing visual and audiovisual works for
commentative effect and vary to the extent they alter

162

For example, one internet phenomena that is not considered is “copypasta” (for
copy/paste). The format consists almost exclusively of text and is commonly seen on
imageboards such as 4chan and Reddit. A user will post a script almost instantly
recognizable to insiders with one or more slight alterations. See e.g., To Be Fair, You Have
to Have a Very High IQ to Understand Rick and Morty, KNOW YOUR MEME (July 17,
2017), https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/to-be-fair-you-have-to-have-a-very-high-iqto-understand-rick-and-morty [https://perma.cc/RE5E-BQME]. Arguably, another
category that may possess memetic status includes indignant responses to ignorant or
bombastic claims on social media. For example, “OK Boomer” (to signify that the person
making the claim too old and detached to understand the problems of young people), “Sir
this is a Wendy’s” (to signify that the person making the claim is doing so in the wrong
forum or in an unnecessarily dramatic manner), or calling the person making the claim
“Karen” (signifying the archetypal soccer mom, demanding to speak to the manager of a
waged employee out of a sense of entitlement) or “Kyle” (signifying a person who is quick
to anger, and embodying traits of toxic masculinity). While these phenomena are no doubt
worthy of further academic research, these kinds of memes find no nexus with fair use or
fair dealing and have been intentionally omitted from the analysis.
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the underlying meaning or message of the original
work;
(2) Exploitables, which rely on direct reproductions
of works as a single frame or series of frames in
which users can add dialog or label objects within the
frame to explicate a relationship between objects and
subjects;163
(3) Edits, which visually transform original works by
adding elements into existing scenes or relocating
subjects into unfamiliar or ironic surroundings; and
(4) Self-referential or Standalone memes, which often utilize and remix crudely drawn characters, referencing digital culture which generally do not engage significant copyright concerns and will not be
discussed in this Article. 164
The first two categories either directly reproduce or allow easy
modification to the underlying image requiring few technical skills
that the average private user could easily grasp,165 while the third
can be executed with widely available software such as Photoshop.166
163

Exploitables, KNOW YOUR MEME (Apr. 10, 2009) https://knowyourmeme.com/
memes/exploitables [https://perma.cc/K4X2-LC2W]. Exploitables differ from Image
Macros in that they often explicate the relationship between objects or subjects in the
frame, whereas image macros may contain a single central theme such as a specific reaction
or attitude.
164
This category includes some “old memes” such as the Advice Animals series, which
depicted an animal on a bi-color radial background. See, for example, Trollface, Rage
Comics, Wojak, and also “old memes” such as Bad Luck Brian, Courage Wolf, and
Socially Awkward Penguin. This final category will not be analyzed as copyright issues
are not triggered by these generally authorless, collaborative memes that do not rely on
mediated images or videos, but they are instructive as they represent the purest expression
of “free play” with images that effectively form the public domain for meme generation.
These are often drawn by the individuals that author the work and are presumed to have
given consent for widespread sharing on social media.
165
See e.g., Well Yes, But Actually No, MEME GENERATOR, https://imgflip.com/
memegenerator [https://perma.cc/U52X-BRS9]; MEME GENERATOR, https://memegenerator.com [https://perma.cc/KL6G-9S2Y]; MAKE A MEME.ORG, https://makea
meme.org [https://perma.cc/S3GD-DPFE].
166
The definition of internet memes employed in this Article is inclusive of video, image,
and GIF variants. One example of a video meme that would be considered under the “edits”
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(1) Image Macros
Figure 1
ure 2

Figure 1

Fig-

Figure 2

category is the Shooting Star video meme, which edits a video of someone jumping or
falling, only for their surroundings to change to outer space, underwater, or any other
background for dramatic effect. The potentially infringing nature of this meme comes not
from use of the video content, which is generally user-generated and unlikely to qualify for
copyright alone, but the distinctive use of a short clip from a sound recording. The 2008
song “Shooting Stars” by the Australian electronic duo Bag Raiders is reproduced at the
moment the subject on screen falls or jumps. Common subjects include runway models or
performing artists that mistakenly find the edge of the stage. This meme is best categorized
as an edit. See e.g., Shooting Stars, KNOW YOUR MEME (June 21, 2020),
https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/shooting-stars [https://perma.ccBMC8-SY97]. When
asked for comment, Bag Raiders said they were “chuffed” that the meme had exposed their
song to such a large audience. This may be an important consideration for the fourth factor
analysis, as appearance in a meme may promote the original work—though this raises
issues of properly attributing unaltered portions of the work. Know Your Meme notes that
the song has more than 13 million views on YouTube and appears in Katy Perry’s music
video “Swish Swish” at 2:10. Katy Perry, Swish Swish (Official) ft. Nicki Minaj, YOUTUBE
(Aug. 24, 2017), https://youtu.be/iGk5fR-t5AU?t=130 [https://perma.cc/C5VP-DU9F].
GIFs will more often than not fall within the “direct reproduction” category. While the
format does not lend itself well to visual edits, it has significant utility recontextualized as
a discursive medium. They may be juxtaposed with other works either within the GIF or
as visually distinct part of an insular whole or used as a means of direct commentary in the
comments section of GIF-enabled platforms such as Twitter and Facebook.
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Figure 3
Figure 4
Oprah Winfrey’s You Get A Car Memes.167
Image Macros—perhaps the most common type of meme—encompass a spectrum of captioned direct reproductions of copyrighted works ranging from those that transform the message or
meaning of the original work with some degree of social commentary, to “reaction images” which are instead used to augment the
user’s own expression.168 There are a number of enduring Image
Macro memes, but many draw upon current events and recent works
of popular culture, sometimes captioning an image only through an
online platform’s user interface. While utilizing a still image from
an audiovisual work or photograph for purposes of self-expression
rather than to entertain or to inform arguably does alter the purpose
of the use from the original, those that use the format to create new
information, insights, and understandings (in the lingo of the US
Second and Ninth Circuits) will have a greater claim to transformativeness than reaction images. In this case, the Oprah memes in Figures 1-3 alter the meaning or message to a greater extent than Figure

167

Oprah’s ‘You Get A Car’, KNOW YOUR MEME (Apr. 5, 2013), https://know
yourmeme.com/memes/oprahs-you-get-a-car
[https://perma.cc/6VVX-AEGN].
On
September 13th, 2004, Oprah Winfrey gave away new Pontiac G6 cars to her audience,
spawning a surprisingly durable image macros meme and a number of video parodies on
TV programs such as Conan and Robot Chicken. This Image Macro has extended recently
to themes such as COVID-19 quarantine orders and the legalization of gay marriage in
countries that criminalize homosexuality. While originally focused on Oprah’s gifting of
cars to her audience, the format is frequently extended to any experience, idea, or debate
that occupies a prominent position in a country’s collective psyche or identity.
168
This category includes “Old Memes” such as the “Advice Animal” format Image
Macros.
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4, which is a “reaction image” type of meme, using Oprah Winfrey’s
expression to amplify the user’s own expression.
(2) Exploitables

Figure 5
Distracted Boyfriend Meme, posted by Leader of the Brexit Party
Nigel Farage to Facebook.169 Photographer: Antonio Guillem
(Stock Image).
Exploitable memes reproduce a single frame or multiple frames
from a photo or audiovisual work as a template, differing from Image Macros in that they label subjects or objects in the frame to explicate a relationship between elements in the frame, or to create a
dialogue between two characters. The visual relationship between
objects or subjects in the frame allow meme creators to discuss other
concepts, often wholly unrelated to the original scene. By labelling
subjects in the frame, meme creators leverage one’s understanding
of the visual relationship between characters to suggest an analogous relationship in another form.170

169

Distracted
Boyfriend,
KNOW
YOUR
MEME
(Jan.
3,
2021),
https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/distracted-boyfriend
[https://perma.cc/45VBRAWL]. See also WIGGINS, supra note 18, at 47.
170
This category also includes exploitable “comic”-style memes that add dialog to a
series of images, relying on the expressions and actions of characters to display countering
sides of a debate. See e.g., American Chopper Argument, KNOW YOUR MEME (Mar. 28,
2018), https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/american-chopper-argument [https://perma.cc/
W5RS-P53Z].
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(3) Edits

Figure 6

Figure 7

Figure 8
Figure 9
Rhianna’s Met Gala Dress Edits171
Edits are a highly creative and varied category of memes in
which users add elements to existing scenes or remove characters
from their original context. Often drawing from audiovisual works
and photographs taken of notable people, they represent a more labor-intensive form of memes which creates new aesthetics and visually alters works in ways that are more immediately cognizable
under transformative use doctrine. They are also generally the category that comes closest to parody, as a prominent element—or the
171

Know Your Meme, “Rhianna’s Met Gala Dress,” May 5th, 2015. https://knowyou
rmeme.com/memes/rihannas-met-gala-dress [https://perma.cc/G52H-AX99]; The Internet
Speaks/Rihanna Met Gala 2015, SPITGAN MAGAZINE (May 6, 2015),
https://blog.spitgan.com/the-internet-says-rihanna-met-gala-2015/ [https://perma.cc/MD
5B-MB23]
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“heart”—of the original image necessarily becomes the object of
ridicule or derision. This category also best represents the carnivalesque “transformative play” that consumers engage in with wellknown works and marks in meme generation.172 In line with what
Marshall173 and Jurgenson174 have observed, these memes can contribute to an integral portion of the serialization of our online public
persona where we communicate our feelings, thoughts, emotions,
and political ideologies. In this Figure 6 displays the original paparazzo photograph of Rhianna on the red carpet at the Met Gala, while
figures 7-9 display Edits depicting the train of the dress as the
Yellow Brick Road in The Wizard of Oz, a pizza, or an emergency
slide of an airplane.
The proposed typology usefully groups memes based on the use
they make of the underlying work, offering enough precision to apply the fair use factors to each category. While Edits bear analogy
to cases involving appropriation artists such as Richard Prince and
Jeff Koons, Image Macros and Exploitable memes rely on a form of
semiotic play that could be understood as the “creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings” that
may “reasonably be perceived” by the online community,175 but
requires a comparison between the author’s intent and the supposed
alteration to that intent by the secondary user. Much like appropriation or pop art (e.g., Andy Warhol’s Marilyn that is based on a
single publicity photograph) that recontextualizes existing works,176
172

Tan, supra note 65, at 87, 98.
See generally supra note 1.
174
JURGENSON, supra note 13.
175
See e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir. 2013); Blanch v. Koons, 467
F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006); Castle Rock Ent., Inc. v. Carol Publ’g. Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d
132, 142 (2d Cir. 1998); Seltzer v. Green Day, 725 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2013).
176
See also Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith, 382 F. Supp. 3d
312 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (finding that each of the Prince Series works may reasonably be
perceived to be transformative of the Goldsmith Prince Photograph). More specifically, the
court found:
The Prince Series works can reasonably be perceived to have transformed
Prince from a vulnerable, uncomfortable person to an iconic, larger-than-life
figure. The humanity Prince embodies in Goldsmith’s photograph is gone.
Moreover, each Prince Series work is immediately recognizable as a “Warhol”
rather than as a photograph of Prince—in the same way that Warhol’s famous
173
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memes that are visually transformative require less emphasis on recoding and reinterpreting the subtext of an original work to be considered fair use. Memes that recode and recontextualize the original
work without visual alteration are harder to situate within existing
fair use doctrines than those that visibly transform an underlying
work. An internet meme can only exist if it refers to something in
addition to the original subject matter it contains,177 existing as an
inherently intertextual medium that draws upon the semiotic aura of
the original work. Most works are indirectly intertextual by adherence to a genre, or directly by way of citation, allusions, parody,
pastiche, etc., but memes often directly appropriate earlier expressions to draw upon their cultural symbolic relevance,178 relying on
the audience’s widespread familiarity and relatability with underlying content to emphasize their message.179 Though internet platforms and social media act as the creative engine for meme content,
they may be further disseminated throughout the physical world.180
B. Memes, Semiotics, and Digital Culture
The last time the US Supreme Court ruled on the fair use doctrine was in Campbell in 1994 before the advent of the internet.
Since then, the internet has evolved from a repository of facts, data,
and documents to a global social community of users engaging with

representations of Marilyn Monroe and Mao are recognizable as “Warhols,”
not as realistic photographs of those persons.
Id. at 326.
177
WIGGINS, supra note 18, at 33.
178
Id. at 35.
179
Kara Podraza, When Is a Little Too Much: The De Minimis Doctrine and Its
Implications for Online Communication Tools, 25 GEO. MASON L. REV. 550 (2018).
180
One of the most enduring memes is Pepe the Frog, having made his debut in Matt
Furie’s Boys’ Club cartoon in 2005. The character saw consistent use as a meme on social
media platforms and imageboards such as 4chan for a number of years as a symbol of
loneliness and alienation, before becoming a symbol of the alt-right during the 2016 United
States Presidential Election. More recently, Pepe has become a symbol for pro-democracy
protestors in Hong Kong protesting China’s extradition bill and featured in the 2020
documentary Feels Good Man, which documents Furie’s attempt to save his character from
the alt right. Pepe the Frog, KNOW YOUR MEME, https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/
pepe-the-frog [https://perma.cc/G9RH-6N2D].
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each other.181 As the world became more networked and as new
technologies have forever changed the way consumers interact with
protected works,182 the copyright law that governs the fair use of
those works has not kept pace.183
Broadly speaking, digital culture is the interaction of people
through computers and mobile devices. While commonly understood to be related primarily to social media, the concept extends to
immediate access to the full breadth of humanity’s digitized
knowledge and the ability to stream video and contribute content on
various platforms.184 The term “digital culture” distinguishes from
earlier forms of media and reflects new ways in which users interact
with copyrighted works, including user-generated content (“UGC”),
algorithmically curated newsfeeds, and the role of social media “influencers.”185 Furthermore, this digital network means so much
181

Jeff Bercovici, Who Coined ‘Social Media’? Web Pioneers Compete for Credit,
FORBES (Dec. 9, 2010), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffbercovici/2010/12/09/whocoined-social-media-web-pioneers-compete-for-credit/
[https://perma.cc/6AT9-22BS],
cited in Tim Kingsbury, Copyright Paste: The Unfairness of Sticking to Transformative
Use in the Digital Age, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1471, 1473 (2018).
182
Holland, supra note 66, at 337. Here, Holland observes:
New technologies that not only enable increased audience engagement with
cultural works, but also facilitate the use of these “raw materials” to produce
new works have made fair use more controversial. At another level, these
technologies have made visible an audience, not of passive content consumers,
but of active participants in the discourse around and about those works.
183
Christopher Sprigman and Kal Raustiala call this development the second digital
disruption. The first was defined by the development of novel distribution methods,
whereas the second is characterized by two-way data flows between producer and
consumer. See Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Second Digital Disruption:
Streaming and the Dawn of Data Driven Creativity, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1555, 1558 (2019).
184
WIGGINS, supra note 18, at 21. Wikipedia is an excellent example of the internet’s
collaborative potential: the online free encyclopedia is available in 309 languages, written
and edited entirely by volunteers. People now carry powerful computers and highresolution cameras everywhere they go in their cell phones. This facilitates the opportunity
to infringe copyright in situations such as making video and audio recordings of
performances and their subsequent reposting, screenshotting copyrighted works, and
sharing works. This development was certainly not in the contemplation of legislative
drafters when they tabled copyright acts, which explains in part the continued legislative
debate surrounding fair use, fair dealing and other exceptions across the world.
185
Id. at 22. Wiggins elaborates upon the idea of participatory culture, asserting that this
earlier conception of human interaction with social media reflects an optimistic and
perhaps naïve conception of a “utopian plateau”, rather than one where not all users have

904

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:864

more than technological interconnectedness—it has been argued to
resemble the “folk” relations of Mikhail Bakhtin’s carnival.186 Social media platforms like Facebook and Instagram can function like
a carnival which “subverts the very hierarchies that impose the kind
of distinction seen in the classes of ‘official culture’ and ‘unofficial
culture’, ‘aristocracy’, and ‘peasants’, implied in the modern intellectual property system.”187 As Bakhtin explains, during the duration of the carnival, “there is a temporary suspension of all hierarchic distinctions and barriers among men and of certain norms and
prohibitions of usual life.”188 Insofar as the laws of copyright are
concerned, the carnivalesque atmosphere of social media gives life
to a network that simultaneously confounds conventional understandings of copyright law and reinvigorates a polyphonous public
sphere.
Ultimately, the digital realm is a readily available carnivalesque
arena for individuals to express themselves and to make—and constantly remake—an online public persona; and it is increasingly becoming a communicative space that is more readily governed by
culturally permissible norms of behavior than by clearly articulated
legal rules. By posting, sharing, and creatively altering what they
find online, social media users use readily available images—especially well-known images imbued with cultural meanings—to construct their public selves.189 Social media also allows people to connect to other people and businesses, facilitating debate of socioeconomic and political issues, among other things. Wiggins asserts that
culture, whether at a societal level or varied levels such as pop culture, counterculture, etc., necessitates a shared understanding and a
level of reliable and systematic sustainability.190 Embedded within

equal access, entry, and impact. This also reflects that while traditional methods of
broadcasting were typically a one-way street, modern dissemination also receives
information from the consumer in the form of viewership and other metadata. See also
Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 183.
186
See, e.g., JOHANNA GIBSON, CREATING SELVES: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
NARRATION OF CULTURE 28–29 (2006) (referring to MIKHAIL BAKHTIN, RABELAIS AND HIS
WORLD (Helene Iswolsky trans., 1984).
187
Id. at 28 (internal citations omitted).
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
WIGGINS, supra note 18, at 7 (emphasis in original).
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that shared understanding is an “in-progress and evolving systems
of interacting, producing, co-creating meaning.”191 Internet memes
remix and recode images and videos with meanings often substantially different from the original expression, evident in the captioning of Oprah memes (Figures 1-4) and the edits of Rhianna’s Dress
(Figures 7-9).192
Memes that are focused on the creation of shared meanings by
commenting on relatable and broadly applicable socio-political
themes largely external to the self (such as a global pandemic or
Brexit), and “reaction image”-style memes (e.g. Figure 4) are simply
different aspects of individual expression that enables users to construct and promote their idealized digital persona through identification with the semiotic coding of the original work.193 By utilizing
well-known characters or works to portray their emotions or reactions rather than a selfie or photo of themselves, individuals leverage
the near-universal semiotic coding and instantly-recognizable features of the original194—at the same time reinforcing that individual’s role as a participant in a mediated digital culture. The carnivalesque atmosphere of social media has effectively broken down
the formalities of hierarchy and the differences between social classes, ages, and nationalities, “replacing established traditions and
canons with a ‘free and familiar’ mode of social interaction based
on principles of mutual cooperation, solidarity and equality.”195
Nathanial Noda also argues that copyright law ought to “keep pace
with changing times and practices by recognizing that an author implicitly cedes certain interpretive rights to the general public when
he or she introduces a work into the stream of public discourse.”196
Fair use is intended to balance a broader societal interest against the

191

Id.
Wiggins proposes a different understanding of “remix” culture in the context of
internet memes: “Remixing occurs as a necessary step in the realization of an internet
meme’s process of generating and sustaining meaning which is co-constructed between the
(unimportant or unknowable) author of a given internet meme and the audience consuming
the message.” Id. at 13.
193
Tan, supra note 15, at 360–61.
194
Id.
195
Gardiner, supra note 42, at 30.
196
Nathaniel T. Noda, Copyright Retold: How Interpretive Rights Foster Creativity and
Justify Fan-Based Activities, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 987, 991 (2010).
192
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exclusive rights of the copyright owner.197 Even before the advent
of the internet, Rosemary Coombe had already highlighted the
potential of intellectual property laws to stifle dialogic uses of some
of the most “powerful, prevalent, and accessible cultural forms.”198
Denying meme creators—especially if they were private non-commercial individuals—protection under fair use risks further impoverishing the cultural public domain and subjecting social media
users to copyright infringement liability or harassment by rights
owners.
C. Emerging Norms and Online Incentives
Cultural norms of fair use in the digital realm vary greatly from
the legal framework imposed by copyright law in 17 U.S.C. § 107.
The divergence of these norms is reinforced by a virtual absence of
copyright enforcement against the private users that create internet
memes. Insofar as the use of copyrighted works is concerned, private non-commercial individual internet users perceive that a “free
culture” permeates the internet.199 If something is published online,
such users often see no harm in reposting those works on different
websites or social media platforms.200 This perceived “free” culture
online naturally conflicts with copyright holders’ exclusive rights to
control reproduction and distribution of their works.201 Ultimately,
197

As Jeanne Fromer and Mark Lemley note: “IP owners’ efforts to take control over the
use of their works in completely different markets create the biggest problems for the IP
system.” Allowing IP owners to stifle meme creation through enforcement of copyright
would not further the goals of copyright law. See Jeanne C. Fromer and Mark A. Lemley,
The Audience in Intellectual Property Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1291–92
(2014).
198
Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual
Property Law and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853, 1855 (1991). See also
Holland, supra note 66, at 338 (“Social semiotics offers an alternate conception of
transformativeness in which social value is manifest in the process of meaning-making that
occurs as individuals and interpretive communities engage the work. Copyright’s
commitment to the enrichment of society can be best evaluated in the context of this
process of semiosis as a distinct question apart from the creation of new authorial rights.”).
199
Mary W. S. Wong, Transformative User-Generated Content in Copyright Law:
Infringing Derivative Works or Fair Use, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1075, 1081 (2009).
See also Lauren Levinson, Adapting Fair Use to Reflect Social Media Norms: A Joint
Proposal, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1038 (2017).
200
Brittany Curtis, Copyright vs. Social Media: Who Will Win, 20 I.P. L. BULL. 81 (2016).
201
Levinson, supra note 199.
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the seemingly permissionless nature of the internet (and more particularly of social media platforms like Instagram and Facebook),
combined with the breakneck speed in which users can download,
alter, and reshare content, have combined to create a semi-anarchic
system where emergent norms constrain user behavior to a greater
extent than do legal and regulatory structures such as copyright law.
The rules and design of specific platforms also constrain and influence user behavior. Moran Yemini notes that social media operates in a symbiotic relationship with its users—they depend on UGC
while at the same time providing the architecture and setting the
rules for how that content can be shared and interacted with.202 This
creates an environment in which users are nudged to share new content that they did not create themselves, sending mixed signals that
unfairly expose sharers to allegations of copyright infringement.203
Social media platforms designed to impel user sharing and community interaction while simultaneously facilitating the effortless dissemination of content, whether copyrighted or not, reinforce the
user’s impression of a free and permissionless sharing culture on the
internet. Norms of attribution among the denizens of digital culture
exist in what Kal Raustiala and Christopher Sprigman call a “lowIP equilibrium,”204 paralleling extra-legal norms of attribution and
202
Moran Yemini, The New Irony of Free Speech, 20 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 119,
162 (2018).
203
WIGGINS, supra note 18, at 87. He observes: “Digital culture often operates on an
assumption that is unique to its essence but dissonant with respect to real-world law and
practice. This assumption posits that what is available or searchable is equally useable,
remixable, etc. In other words, if I can access it, I can use it, drag it off the website,
download the video, remix it, etc. in order to offer my own version of whatever it happens
to be. By and large, this approach largely defines much of digital culture in terms of
common practice. Yet, laws remain in place despite the grab-and-share, copy/paste, etc.
aspects of digital culture.” Id.
204
Memes seem to be an example of Raustiala and Sprigman’s “low-IP equilibrium
situation,” in which a lack of IP protection spurs on greater innovation and creativity and
leads creators within the equilibrium to develop extra-legal norms that parallel copyright.
Raustiala and Sprigman examine the role of copying in the fashion industry, finding that
the pervasiveness of copying by fast-fashion brands accelerates the fashion cycle. As trends
become available to the masses, fashion cognoscenti seek out emerging trends. Memes
share a similar cycle of emergence, popularity, and trend death, but these cycles are often
driven by the media they draw from. Memes will often draw from recent films, series, or
news events, often finding widespread popularity before fading as new developments in
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enforcement in high-end cuisine and stand-up comedy.205 In digital
culture, norms of attribution manifest among artists, meme-aggregating accounts, and private individuals alike as a means of gaining
a substantial social media following and the benefits that accrue
from being “Instafamous.”206
the social world spur on further meme creation. While not all memes become widely
known, a small number endure well beyond the popular discussion of their underlying
work. Analogously, memes thrive upon the low-IP equilibrium created by a legislative void
and lack of enforcement. See generally KAL RAUSTIALA AND CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE
KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION (2015).
205
See Christopher J. Buccafusco, On the Legal Consequences of Sauces: Should
Thomas Keller’s Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1121,
1152 (2007). See also Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The
Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy,
94 VA. L. REV. 1787, 1791 (2008). Sprigman explains how a system of intellectual property
norms has developed independent of any legal framework in stand-up comedy, a field that
has not traditionally been protected by copyright law. He notes that comedians’ IP norms
“generally parallel those ordered by copyright law, namely authorship, ownership, transfer
of rights, fair use and other exceptions to ownership.” The informal sanctions imposed on
joke-stealing comics can be analogized to accounts that “steal” memes from other accounts,
which reached its most prominent example in 2019 when meme content creators and
aggregators sanctioned a popular Instagram meme account “@fuckjerry” with public
shaming for taking content without permission or attribution under the hashtag
“#fuckfuckjerry.” However, while joke-stealing can result in hampered career prospects
for comics, social media accounts may just lose a small portion of their following. The
tendency of bigger accounts appropriating from smaller ones carries a similar “clout”
problem to Sprigman’s analysis of joke-theft by popular comics. Id. at 1824. In the case of
@fuckjerry, his following went from 14.3 million to 14 million followers, and he released
a public statement promising to get advanced permission to repost memes. See also Alexis
Madrigal, “The Limits of Extremely Online Organizing,” THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 13, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/02/fuckfuckjerry-the-limits-ofextremely-online-organizing/582556/ [https://perma.cc/X6SS-FHBQ].
206
Norms of attribution have developed in part from creators wanting to be recognized
for their creativity, but also due to the market principles at work on social media that reward
accounts with large followings with potential endorsement and advertising revenues, free
product testing, and a range of social benefits that accrue through being “instafamous.”
Some meme accounts will watermark their original content, such as Instagram user
@sonny5ideup’s use of translucent fried eggs to prevent meme stealing. In this way,
watermarking content operates as a trademark, while also providing attribution to the
creators in a digital culture in which memes are shared, reposted, and published on other
platforms. While influencers and other celebrities on social media have a significant
number of revenue opportunities such as sponsorships and endorsements as a result of their
marketable personality, meme accounts are more limited to acting as advertisers or creating
meme-related merchandise. See Taylor Lorenz, “Memes Are Becoming Harder to
ATLANTIC
(MAY
31,
2018),
Monetize,”
THE
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III. ARE MEMES FAIR USE?
A. Purpose and Character of the Use
The first factor analyzes two elements: (1) the extent to which
the secondary work is different in purpose or character from the
original work,207 or whether it transforms the original with “new expression, meaning, or message”,208 or where the original has been
used in the “creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings” that may “reasonably be perceived”;209
and (2) the commerciality of the use. A commercial use may still be
fair, but it must be sufficiently or highly transformative in order to
counterbalance its commerciality for the first factor to weigh in favor of fair use. The commerciality of the online personas of celebrities, influencers, and meme-aggregating accounts may impart a
commercial character to their expression, particularly when that
same online account is used to promote products or services.210
However, this commerciality tends to be subservient to a particular
meme’s significant transformation of the underlying work.

https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/05/memes-are-becoming-harderto-monetize/561578/ [https://perma.cc/QD2J-T2NT]. For a discussion on the changing
nature of contemporary fame, see DAVID TAN, THE COMMERCIAL APPROPRIATION OF FAME:
A CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND PASSING OFF 22–26 (2017).
207
17 U.S.C. §107. See also TCA TV Corp. v. McCollum, 839 F.3d 168, 182 (2d Cir.
2016) (“The only purpose served by the extent of defendants’ taking is identically comedic
to that of the original authors, that is, to have two performers expand on a singular joke in
order to generate increasing audience laughter.”); VHT, Inc. v. Zillow Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d
723, 742 (9th Cir. 2019) (“That Digs makes these images searchable does not
fundamentally change their original purpose when produced by VHT: to artfully depict
rooms and properties.”).
208
Campbell v. Rose-Acuff Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 596, 579 (1994).
209
Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir. 2013); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244,
253 (2d Cir. 2006); Castle Rock Ent., Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp. Inc., 150 F.3d 138, 142 (2d
Cir. 1998); Seltzer v. Green Day, 725 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 2013).
210
The Supreme Court ruled in Harper & Row that “[t]he crux of the profit/nonprofit
distinction is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the user
stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the customary
price.” Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985). A court
may find that in posting copyrighted meme content, commercial users derive benefits
through increased consumer engagement with the brand whether there is a marketing
message or not; and quasi-commercial users such as celebrities, influencers and memeaggregating accounts similarly seek to profit through posting or reposting these memes
whether directly through paid endorsements or indirectly through free merchandise.
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As pointed out above, individuals invariably engage in differing
degrees of “transformative play” on social media in the digital
era211—and memes are an important part of this social communication. Meme creators utilize well-known works or characters to draw
upon their symbolic value as raw materials for their own expression,
or as a means of recoding, subverting or criticizing the dominant or
conventional interpretations of those works.212 Internet memes result from a process of audience interaction and participation with
some of the most prevalent and salient cultural forms available to
the public, in a way that “triggers unexpected social responses, cultivating new and expansive cultural meanings, messages, and insights.”213 They are an example of precisely the kind of socially valuable expressive activities that should be permitted within the First
Amendment’s guarantee of “breathing space” for secondary uses.214
According to Rosenblatt, “the carnivalesque engages in dialogue by
assigning a folk meaning to (religious or other authoritarian) signs,
resisting a power structure that would assign a monologic meaning
to those same signs.”215 In fair use-speak, this would require that the
“creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings” may “reasonably be perceived” in the repurposing of
the original signs.216 Image Macro memes, as exemplified by the
211

See e.g., Tan, supra note 54. See also Tan, supra note 53.
Holland, supra note 66, at 338 (discussing transformative use as a social semiotic
process and First Amendment concerns); Tan, supra note 15, at 361 (“Like famous
trademarks, the copyrighted character signifier/signified relationship would have become
universally codified for the audience; the audience will automatically and consistently
think of the coded meanings and values (the signified) when they are exposed to the
character signifiers.”).
213
Holland, supra note 66, at 361 (“Can audience engagement with a work matter? What
if audience interaction with and about the work triggers unexpected social responses,
cultivating new and expansive cultural meanings, messages, and insights? Does
accommodating this work, as a necessary constituent of the social value of new expression?
If fair use is taken seriously as a doctrine of accommodation, distinct from monopoly
incentives, then the answer is yes.”).
214
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
215
Rosenblatt, supra note 11, at 388. Rosenblatt also comments that “fair uses dismember
works and bring them closer so that they can be examined, experimented with, critiqued,
laughed at. Each of these genres ‘profanes’ sacralized (here, copyrighted) symbols by
playing with them.” Id. at 389.
216
Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706–07 (2d Cir. 2013); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d
244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006); Castle Rock Ent., Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 141
(2d Cir. 1998); Seltzer v. Green Day, 725 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 2013).
212
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Oprah memes above, as well as Exploitable memes such as Nigel
Farage’s pro-Brexit Distracted Boyfriend memes represent non-visually transformative uses that nonetheless use the underlying work
as “raw material” for political, social, and cultural expressions—
which all also enjoy First Amendment protection.
Holland compellingly argues that the search for authorial intent
in the secondary uses that demand fair use protection is misguided,
noting that copyright’s monopoly-incentive is often wrongly imported into fair use’s guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright law.217 This is bolstered by the Second Circuit’s
current jurisprudence when assessing visual works in focusing on
what may “reasonably be perceived” by the audience regardless of
authorial intent.218 Transformative use doctrine as applied by the
Second and Ninth Circuits suggests that courts may be willing consider evidence of semiotic transformation, whether visual or not.
Tan suggests that current approach in these Circuits “appears to be
able to accommodate the shifting of the transformativeness inquiry
from locating an authorial presence or authorial activity, to one of
reader interpretation, i.e. whether one might reasonably perceive the
creation of ‘new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings.’” 219 He emphasizes that “even a visually non-transformative work may be contextually transformative because it has
introduced new ideas fundamentally different from the original.”220
By recognizing the role of audience interpretation (and reinterpretation) in fair use, the Second and Ninth Circuits’ approaches may accommodate both visually and non-visually transformative memes.
Considering Figures 1-3, a still image taken from an iconic
Oprah television episode is used to comment on issues such as gay
marriage and the COVID-19 pandemic, including its social effects
such as homeschooling as a result of nationwide lockdowns and

217

Holland, supra note 66, at 381 (“Valuable new expression—new meanings and new
messages—created by social interaction with the work can occur entirely apart from the
author.”).
218
Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707. See also ROBERT HODGE & GUNTHER KRESS, SOCIAL
SEMIOTICS 12 (1988) (“Meaning is always negotiated in the semiotic process, never simply
imposed inexorably from above by an omnipotent author through an absolute code.”).
219
Tan, supra note 54, at 84.
220
Id. at 85.
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school closures.221 No visual alteration has occurred save for the addition of a caption, and yet, the audience’s reasonable perception of
a transformative change in purpose or character is likely. While the
original work depicted Oprah’s gift of new automobiles, her statement “You get a car!” has been playfully recoded to deal with current issues, providing a valuable meme template for the creation of
“new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings.” Figure 4 depicts a Reaction Image-style Image Macro meme
and varies from the earlier examples based on the use it makes of
the underlying work.222 While earlier examples recoded Oprah’s famous quote, Figure 4 removes the original context entirely, using
her image to augment the user’s own expression of the same emotion. In doing so, the meme is arguably “contextually transformative” by taking a small portion of a TV entertainment work and using
it as a digital self-expression.223 Figure 4 can be distinguished from
TCA v. McCollum which held that the use of Abbott and Costello’s
famous “Who’s on First” skit was copied for the same dramatic purpose as it was originally written. Figure 4 manifests a substantially
different purpose than the original: from entertaining the audience
on television to communicating one’s emotions in an ironic manner
during a pandemic lockdown. As noted above, users repurpose wellknown characters and works to amplify their digital self-expression
and to affirm their participation within digital culture.
Figure 5 depicts former UKIP and current Brexit Party leader
Nigel Farage’s Facebook post discussing an overtly political message.224 While Farage’s use of the image in a meme may not be permissible under the UK’s categorical fair dealing provision, it would
almost certainly qualify as a transformative use in the US, despite
the minimal visual alteration. The original stock image was ostensibly intended for licensed use in online blogs or news forums for its
221

Oprah’s ‘You Get A Car’, supra note 168.
Id.
223
Tan, supra note 54, at 85. The change in context alone may not be dispositive of a fair
use inquiry, but it often facilitates a change in purpose. While arguably less transformative
and further from the shelter of constitutionally-protected speech, the radical change in
context and use suggest a moderate-to-high degree of transformation that can neutralize or
displace any marginally-commercial character that may vary depending on the user (i.e.,
private users vs. influencers vs. business accounts).
224
Distracted Boyfriend, supra note 170.
222
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ability to present a romantic betrayal simplistically and plainly, a
message that it has successfully and exhaustively captured. Subsequent meme usage of the image as an Exploitable meme labels the
three characters to explicate a relationship between three related
concepts, in this case Italy’s desirous gaze at a Brexit-style option.
The “creation of . . . new insights and understandings” by making
use of an image limited in its potential meanings for political ends
is a clear transformation of purpose and character of the original
work. Brammer v. Violent Hues, which concerned the unlicensed
use of a photograph online can be distinguished from the transformations in Figures 1-3 and 5 in that the secondary use utilized the
photograph for the content itself, while the memes have drawn upon
the earlier works to communicate new information, insights, and understandings of political, social, and cultural issues.225 Figures 7-9
display Edits of the original red carpet photograph of Rhianna’s
dress from the 2015 Met Gala, depicted as the Yellow Brick Road
from The Wizard of Oz, a pepperoni pizza, and an aircraft emergency
slide.226 The original image (Figure 6) depicts Rihanna in a resplendent haute couture dress designed by Guo Pei, while the edited
images visually criticize and ridicule the opulent over-the-top look
in humorous ways, which calls to mind the smirking face of Leslie
Nielsen superimposed on Demi Moore’s naked pregnant body as
photographed by Annie Leibovitz which was found to be fair use.227
Current transformative use jurisprudence applies most unproblematically to Edits, in which visual transformation alters or recontextualizes key elements in the frame to suit the secondary user’s discursive intent.228
225

Brammer v. Violet Hues Prods., 922 F.3d 255, 261 (4th Cir. 2019). Figure 4 can
likewise be distinguished from Brammer in that its use of the earlier work demonstrates a
marked shift in purpose, from mass media to mediated self-expression.
226
Rihanna’s Met Gala Dress, KNOW YOUR MEME (May 5, 2015),
https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/rihannas-met-gala-dress
[https://perma.cc/L8K7ADKU]. The dress was also mocked as resembling a poured omelet and a yellow condom.
227
Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 115 (2d Cir. 1998).
228
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569, 598 (1994) warned “that courts should not accord fair use protection to profiteers who
do no more than add a few silly words to someone else’s song or place the characters from
a familiar work in novel or eccentric poses.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 598. However, TCA
can be distinguished on the basis that its reproduction of Abbott and Costello’s “Who’s on
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Holland suggests that “an infringement defendant claiming this
[social semiotics-informed] form of transformativeness would
therefore need to produce evidence of audience engagement and the
negotiation of new and distinct meanings around the text.”229 As a
format, memes are an iterative form of digital expression that results
from audience engagement with existing works that takes the form
of either renegotiating or actively subverting the original meanings
of those works, and so appear to be highly transformative uses under
the first factor.230 The current transformative use analysis by the
courts appears to be able to accommodate the protection of non-visual transformations present in Image Macro and Exploitable memes.
While there is an apparent reinvigoration of the fourth factor in the
Second Circuit, neither this factor nor any arguably commercial
character of the user would seem capable of outweighing the transformativeness of these categories of memes.231
B. Nature of the Work
The second factor examines the nature of the original work, considering that “some works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others.”232 Creative works such as audiovisual
works and photographs receive thick copyright protection whether
they depict fictional works or factual settings, but this factor “may
be of limited usefulness where the creative work of art is being used

First” introduced no new purpose, while Edits memes often parody original images in a
way consistent with recent fair use rulings on the works of pop artists such as Andy Warhol,
Jeff Koons and Richard Prince. In this case, there is a clear parodic usage that differentiates
these Edits memes from the infringing use of “Who’s on First” in the play.
229
Holland, supra note 66, at 391–92.
230
Id. at 361 (“Meaning is not controlled, transmitted, or even consistent. It is, instead,
negotiated and actualized in engagement with the audience, or, more appropriately,
audiences.”). See also Tan, supra note 54, at 86: “Parodies, fan fiction and appropriation
art are the best examples of trans-coding practices where an irreverent portrayal of an iconic
literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work has recoded its semiotic meanings to express a
different or counterviewpoint that creates new insights and understandings, thus rendering
the secondary use ‘transformative’ in nature.”
231
Holland, supra note 66, at 357 (“The fair use doctrine is not, after all, concerned with
incentivizing the creation of new works through the grant of monopoly. Rather, the heart
of the fair use doctrine is its ‘guarantee of breathing space within the confines of
copyright.’”).
232
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587.
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for a transformative purpose.”233 As demonstrated above, the
Second and Ninth Circuits’ transformative use approach appears
to accommodate both visual and non-visual transformations as
employed in memes.
Holland’s semiotic analysis of the iconic “Hope” poster featuring Barack Obama found the original photograph’s typically thick
copyright protection nevertheless yielded to a highly transformative
secondary use.234 He argues that the original photograph could be
described “as an attempt to capture unremarkable semiotic resources
with powerful encoded meanings, to combine those resources and
present the text in an unremarkable way, and to do so for the purposes of conveying conventional meanings.”235 Likewise, the original image of Oprah depicts an unremarkable (if perhaps instantlyrecognizable) talk show set, shot from a camera whose location was
dictated by custom and necessity rather than a creative decision.
The red-carpet photos of Rhianna utilized in the Edits (figures 6-9)
demonstrate limited creativity or originality on the part of the photographer, whose positioning and framing of the star was most probably happenstance, after being jostled by hundreds of other photographers jockeying for a near-identical shot. Though photographs
generally exist at the core of copyright protection, these photographs
do not exhibit significant creativity in terms of its lighting, styling,
subject arrangement and aesthetic choices and seem more deserving
of thin rather than thick protection. In comparison, the stock photograph used in Farage’s Facebook meme post (Figure 5) required
slightly more creative effort than the Oprah image, including the
wardrobe and styling of the models. Nonetheless, this factor is rarely
dispositive in fair use, and is neutral or at best tilts very slightly
against fair use.

233

Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 257 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Bill Graham Archives v.
Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 612 (2d Cir. 2006)). The Second Circuit held “the
second fair-use factor has limited weight in our analysis because Koons used Blanch’s
work in a transformative manner to comment on her image’s social and aesthetic meaning
rather than to exploit its creative virtues.” Id.
234
Holland, supra note 66, at 385.
235
Id.
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C. Amount and Substantiality of Use
The third factor analysis considers whether “‘the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole’ are reasonable in relation to the purpose of the copying.”236 The Supreme Court held in Campbell that while the nature
of parody requires some taking from the “heart” of the work, excessive copying of its expressive elements may weigh against a finding
of fair use, especially where the secondary use is not sufficiently
transformative under the first factor or provides a market substitute
for the original under the fourth.237 The extent to which non-parodic
and non-satirical uses may borrow from the original is less certain.
Given that memes often borrow from the “heart” of a work, there
needs to be sufficient justification for the copying—without which
the third factor seems initially to favor copyright owners.
Figures 1-3 and 7-9 (Oprah’s You Get a Car! and Rhianna’s Met
Gala Dress) display clear parodic intent in their repurposing of, and
reference to, elements of the original work, which provides justification to copy from the “heart” of the work.238 That considered, the
amount and substantiality taken from Oprah’s daytime talk show is
minimal—one frame out of a single episode. However, the Edits of
Rhianna utilize all or a significant portion of the original photograph
but would likely be justified in their copying as a parodic fair use of
the original.239 Internet meme creators are rarely identified, but their
use of current or well-known pop-culture works and other userfound images finds its justification in the process of audience interpretation and meaning-making within digital culture. Figures 4 and
5’s use can be justified on these grounds, despite their lack of comment on or reference to the original work. Highly transformative use
diminishes the weight of other factors such as the amount and
236

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985)).
237
Id.
238
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
239
The Second Circuit cautioned that “[a] secondary work may modify the original
without being transformative,” but “‘works that add something new’ and [present] images
with a fundamentally different aesthetic will be considered transformative.” See Leibovitz
v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 1998). The recontextualization of
a single object in frame in Figure 9 is reminiscent of Jeff Koons’ copying of one element
of Andrea Blanch’s fashion photograph in Koons II.
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substantiality taken, but there are also important policy arguments
concerning free speech and democratic participation with prominent
cultural symbols that should be considered by courts adjudicating
widespread digital repurposing of mediated works.
D. Effect on Market and Potential Market for the Work
Despite the dominance of transformative use doctrine that underpinned the first factor over almost three decades, the fourth factor
has enjoyed a resurgence, and is considered “ the most important”
fair use factor. 240 The interaction between the first and the fourth
factors does implicitly suggest the doctrinal primacy of the fourth
factor as the focus is ultimately on the economic impact on the demand for the original work and its derivatives.241 Ginsburg notes
that the dominant role of transformative use doctrine under the first
factor appears to be giving way to a more fulsome consideration of
the statutory factors, and a renewed emphasis on the fourth factor in
particular,242 citing TCA v. McCollum as an example of the Second
Circuit’s willingness to engage in textual analysis as a demonstration of this increasingly skeptical approach to purportedly transformative uses and their market effects.243

240

See Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., 910 F.3d 649, 662 (2d Cir. 2018) (citing
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566 (1985)).
241
See e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590.
242
Other academics have noted the risk of allowing transformativeness under the first
factor to dominate the market harm analysis under the fourth. See e.g., Beebe, supra note
89, at 588–91 (discussing the “stampeding” of the four factors); Ginsburg, supra note 93,
at 287 (“The formula ‘if transformative work/purpose, then no market harm’ meets its
corollary: ‘If commercial and not transformative, then market harm.’ Thus, fair use
continues to reduce to a one-factor test, but one that cuts both ways.”).
243
Ginsburg, supra note 93, at 287. Ginsburg also emphasizes a renewed consideration
of the “value” of the work separate from the market harm analysis, considering its effects
on the monopoly-incentive structure established under copyright. Interestingly, meme
usage of well-known works may actually benefit the underlying copyright. Perhaps
counterintuitively, widespread usage in memes of a well-known work may enhance the
value of the copyright. Fromer similarly comments that secondary uses that transform the
original can have positive effects on the copyrighted work’s value that should be relevant
under the fair use analysis, as these uses “can draw attention to, enhance, or affirm the
work’s role in the marketplace.” Fromer, supra note 134, at 630.
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Internet memes tend to be highly transformative under the first
factor, thus reducing their relevant fourth factor market impacts.244
Memes neither create a market substitute for the original nor infringe directly on the exclusive rights to authorize derivative works,
as no real licensing market exists for memes. Applying his social
semiotics framework to the market effects of potential licensing
markets for originals under the fourth factor, Holland argues that
“[w]hen the flow of discourse around the subsequent work moves
significantly outside these dominant structures and constraints [present in the original work], these markets are less foreseeable.”245
Even where licensing markets may exist, such as the underlying
photographs in Figures 5-9, this means that the relevant derivative
and licensing markets are constrained to secondary works and uses
that make use of the original within the semiotic constraints of its
original purpose and character; seemingly a restatement of transformative use doctrine, but one that actively reframes the analysis
as one which explicitly recognizes the role of audience discourse
and interaction with the work.
The Oprah memes in Figures 1-4 do not produce a market alternative for Oprah’s talk show, nor is there any evidence that the increased exposure of her car giveaway led to any relevant market
harms for the copyright in Oprah Winfrey’s talk show. The stock
image used in Figure 5 was ostensibly produced for uses on commercial websites, news sites, and other licensed digital uses, a wellestablished market. Likewise, the paparazzo photo depicted in Figure 6 would ostensibly be licensed for use in tabloids and celebrity
news websites. In Brammer, the Fourth Circuit considered the direct
reproduction of a photo used exclusively and expressly for its contents—the depiction of the Adams Morgan neighborhood.246 Wisely
rejecting the defendant’s argument that the “informational” use was
transformative of the original purpose, the court cautioned that such

244

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 (“[W]hen a commercial use amounts to mere duplication
of the entirety of an original, it clearly “supersede[s] the objects,” of the original and serves
as a market replacement for it, making it likely that cognizable market harm to the original
will occur. But when, on the contrary, the second use is transformative, market substitution
is at least less certain, and market harm may not be so readily inferred.”).
245
Holland, supra note 66, at 388–89.
246
Brammer v. Violent Hues Prods., LLC, 922 F.3d. 255, 261 (4th Cir. 2019).
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a broad application of transformative use doctrine would effectively
remove copyright protection from photographs and that Violent
Hues impermissibly intruded upon Brammer’s licensing market.247
Secondary uses of licensable photographs such as memes are easily
distinguished from the commercial use in Brammer. Under a semiotic analysis, the Distracted Boyfriend Exploitable meme and
Rhianna’s Dress Edits exist far outside the textual constraints of the
original works, and audience engagement in recoding and recontextualizing these works for a discursive purpose has moved far beyond
the foreseeable markets for those works.248 While a renewed emphasis on the fourth factor jeopardizes marginally-transformative uses
or those with discernable market impacts, this fact favors Image
Macro, Edits and Exploitable memes, in part due to their transformativeness, and in part because they produce no competing substitute
for the original work.
CONCLUSION
Social media today invariably enable and encourage the creation
of individuated online identities through repetition, reproduction,
and remixing. Marshall astutely observes that we are collectively
reconstituted as intercommunicated public personas online249 and
our online persona is “a projection of our self for particular and directed purposes . . . derived from the archive of material that circulates around our online activity.”250 Jurgenson similarly notes that
social media has resulted in “calculated avatar performance”251 and
that the social media profile emerges as a kind of library to make
our pasts accessible and (equally important) to give ourselves an

247

Id. at 264.
It is not a relevant market harm that a transformative secondary use may eclipse the
market for the original work, as appears to have happened to the stock image featured in
Distracted Boyfriend as a result of audience association with the meme format. See e.g.,
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 (“The cognizable harm is market substitution, not any harm
from criticism. As to parody pure and simple, it is unlikely that the work will act as a
substitute for the original, since the two works usually serve different market functions.”).
249
THE CELEBRITY PERSONA PANDEMIC, supra note 1,at 71.
250
Id. at 73–74.
251
JURGENSON, supra note 13, at 72.
248
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order.”252 Put in a different way, we are all using a mélange of
images, text, and videos—comprising self-generated and infringing
works—for the purposes of constructing this intercommunicated
public persona that participates in an online environment that is
characterized by anti-ideology and anti-authority features.
It is worthwhile taking a parting look at a recent internet meme
that has taken the world by storm. The photograph by Getty photographer Brendan Smialowski of Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont,
a former presidential candidate, sitting comfortably masked, crosslegged and bundled up in a bulky coat with garish oversized mittens,
at President Joe Biden’s inauguration on January 20, 2021, has captured the imagination of netizens as the image is inserted into a panoply of famous scenarios and everyday situations that include being
on the USS Enterprise in Star Trek, at The Last Supper, sitting with
Forrest Gump on a bench, and having a conference with the superhero group The Avengers.253 “Bernie Sanders Wearing Mittens Sitting in a Chair” has been expressed as Image Macro and Exploitable
memes,254 and Nick Swahney, an N.Y.U. student had created an app
that allowed users to drop the Bernie Sanders image into any location in the world.255 The original photograph depicts a down-to-earth
dowdy Sanders who values comfort over style, and is confidently
unperturbed by what people may think of his appearance (Figure
10). The different versions of the meme shown below play with the
Sanders image showing how at home the nonplussed senator can be
in all these ridiculous scenarios, thus repurposing the original work
which Smialowski confessed did not have any particular meaning to
it. “I saw Sen. Sanders out of my other eye kind of fiddling with his
252

Id. at 85.
Mike Ives and Daniel Victor, Bernie Sanders Is Once Again the Star of a Meme, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/21/us/politics/bernie-sandersmeme.html [https://perma.cc/8HBN-CT4X].
254
Bernie Sanders Wearing Mittens Sitting in a Chair, KNOW YOUR MEME (Jan. 21,
2021), https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/bernie-sanders-wearing-mittens-sitting-in-achair#fn1 [https://perma.cc/5T63-FXC6].
255
The app has been discontinued, but almost 10 million Bernie Sanders memes had been
created. Nick Sawhney, Put Bernie Anywhere!, BERNIE-SITS.HEROKUPAPP.COM,
http://bernie-sits.herokuapp.com/ [https://perma.cc/J8RE-7U99]. See also Megan Graham,
How to Put Bernie Sanders Into Any Shot on Google Maps Street View or Snapchat, CNBC
(Jan. 21, 2021, 3:42 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/21/how-to-put-bernie-sandersinto-google-maps-street-view-or-snapchat-.html [https://perma.cc/V88X-TVKG].
253
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gloves. It was just a nice moment when he crossed his legs and
crossed his arms,” Smialowski said. “I threw the camera over to
him.”256 When asked why he thought the photograph of Sanders
resulting in the meme becoming an internet sensation so quickly,
Smialowski replied, “Sen. Sanders has a very well-defined brand
and image. He is who he is and he’s comfortable in that and it’s very
much part of his politics.”257
Sanders entered into a licensing agreement with Getty Images to
sell merchandise bearing the Bernie Sanders meme, including
T-shirts, sweatshirts and stickers, on his campaign website with the
money going to charitable organizations.258 Getty Images also confirmed that it will donate its proceeds from the licensing agreement
to Meals on Wheels of America.259 While the online sharing of the
Bernie Sanders image as Image Macro and Exploitable memes is
arguably transformative,260 the reproduction of the memes on an
assortment of merchandise261—in particular, only the image of
Sanders sitting in a chair—may tilt the scales against a finding of
fair use as there would be an adverse impact on the commercial
licensing market currently exploited by Getty Images. By moving
into the physical world of merchandising, one has exited the digital
carnivalesque in which greater permissibility is accorded to

256

Hannah Miao, ‘It’s Just Bernie Being Bernie’—How a Photo of Sanders Wearing
Mittens on Inauguration Day Went Viral, CNBC (Jan. 23, 2021, 2:36 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/23/bernie-sanders-inauguration-meme-heres-the-storybehind-the-photo.html [https://perma.cc/37ED-3NNK].
257
Id.
258
Chairman Sanders Crewneck, BERNIE SANDERS CAMPAIGN STORE (Jan. 21, 2021),
https://store.berniesanders.com/products/chairman-sanderscrewneck?variant=32787050004551 [https://perma.cc/3WUR-6YJZ].
259
Lisa Rathke, Bernie Sanders’ Inauguration Mittens, Memes Help Raise $1.8M for
Charity, ABC13 EYEWITNESS NEWS (Jan. 27, 2021), https://abc13.com/bernie-sandersmittens-meme-at-biden-inauguration-best-memes-buzzfeed-origin/10073344/
[htpps://perma.cc/M5MY-LWEM].
260
See the discussion supra Section III.A.
261
Kala Herh and Zoe Malin, 10 Funny Gifts Inspired by the Bernie Sanders Mittens
Meme, NBC NEWS (Jan. 28, 2021, 4:42PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/shopping/giftguides/bernie-mittens-meme-gifts-n1256020 [htpps://perma.cc/3QZX-8X78]; Nicole
Goodkind, As the Meme Turns: Bernie with Mittens Merch Has Dropped, FORTUNE (Jan.
22, 2021, 7:17 PM), https://fortune.com/2021/01/22/bernie-sanders-inauguration-mittensmeme-merch/ [https://perma.cc/6YGN-6AGB].
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transformative play and entered the realm where the hegemony of
copyright laws ought to apply.

Figure 10
Original photograph by Brendan Smialowski/Agence France-Presse
—Getty Images262

Figure 11
Senator Bernie Sanders on USS Enterprise in Star Trek263
262
263

Bernie Sanders Wearing Mittens Sitting in a Chair, supra note 254.
Id.
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Figure 12
Senator Bernie Sanders in the Distracted Boyfriend Meme264

Figure 13
Senator Bernie Sanders with The Avengers265
Each meme on a Facebook or Twitter profile could function like
our own user-generated content, and “place each moment in a narrative with a point of view and a purpose, more like a memoir with

264

@ashtroid22, TWITTER (Jan. 21, 2021) https://twitter.com/ashtroid22/status/
1352079682137583616/photo/2 [https://perma.cc/K8Y5-NYBK].
265
@AshleyKSmalls, TWITTER (Jan. 21, 2021) https://twitter.com/AshleyKSmalls/
status/1352099922988961792/photo/1 [https://perma.cc/DMT4-XYUH].
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a grand narrative.”266 Unsurprisingly, memes, with their rich semiotic connotations, are popularly used for the purpose of creating,
maintaining and remaking of a digital public persona, and should
generally qualify as highly transformative secondary uses that repurpose copyrighted works in a digital medium. Each sign is assimilated into the carnival language with its meanings changed and exploited in a multitude of heterogeneous layers. In this carnivalesque
environment, they may be employed for discursive activities—such
as using an Oprah meme to humorously comment on the COVID19 pandemic or gay marriage—or just simply employed to amplify
one’s emotion at a particular moment in time much like writing a
digital diary on social media. In the context of an interconnected
networked community in the 21st century, there is significant public
benefit or public interest in recognizing memes as part of our new
international cultural vocabulary and multi-directional discourse
that has engendered important “group-based and society-based public interests.”267 In the words of Shifman, “[c]opies become, in this
sense, more important than the ‘original’: They are the raison d’etre
of digital communication.”268
The authors acknowledge that it is always a risky venture to engage in a preliminary interdisciplinary exploration of linguistic, cultural, political, and legal concepts, and there is more work to be done
in this regard. In Bakhtin’s utopia of bourgeois frivolity, the work
of the imagination is the most important social asset as carnival and
communication are inextricably intertwined in transgressive play
which celebrates “the joyful relativity of all hierarchical, authoritarian structures.”269 The phenomena of meme sharing and other social
media activities indeed exist in a digital dialogized carnival characterized by the laughing, material and game cultures. Like in Bakhtin’s carnival where “[d]egrees of transgression were bound by perfectly applied choreographic rules”,270 transgressive infringing uses
of works protected by copyright are only permissible according to
266

JURGENSON, supra note 13, at 88.
Sun, supra note 21, at 151. Sun also argues that one may treat fair use as a “collective
user right.” Id. at 168–69.
268
Shifman, supra note 156, at 373.
269
Gardiner, supra note 42, at 30.
270
Lachmann, supra note 7, at 118.
267
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the legal rules of fair use. This Article does not contend that there
should be a per se rule that all internet memes are fair use. Fair use
ought to be found for most private individuals using memes, but the
finding may not be as certain for influencers on social media who
gain a commercial benefit from their social media account or for
multinational corporations seeking to capitalize on popular iconic
works for profit. In line with the decisions in cases such as Blanch,
Cariou, and Seltzer, the transformative use analysis applied by the
Second and Ninth Circuits appears to be able to protect a kaleidoscope of memes from copyright infringement liability so long as a
recoding or repurposing of the original can “reasonably be perceived.” The flexibility of the fair use analysis enables U.S. courts
to develop jurisprudence surrounding memes in a way that reflects
their social value in this new digital age. By accommodating transformative digital uses such as memes under fair use, courts can better balance between copyright holders’ exclusive rights and breathing space within the confines of copyright law all within this playful
digital carnivalesque.

